Re:Repositories held for ransom by using valid credentials
by gitlab-security on Saturday May 04, 2019 @01:41PM
(#19827942)
To provide additional context, on GitLab.com, we maintain two weeks' backups. The last time we restored a single project repo, it was a significant effort that utilized many hours of an SRE's time to complete.
Re:Repositories held for ransom by using valid credentials
by mikeash on Saturday May 04, 2019 @04:38PM
(#19829226)
What’s crazy isn’t the loss of data (that happens, and I don’t really expect most cloud services to be save me from explicit deletion requests) but rather framing it as no data being lost because your customers have it elsewhere.
Re:Repositories held for ransom by using valid credentials
by insomniacity on Saturday May 04, 2019 @02:17PM
(#19828190)
"many hours" is too high. Regardless of this incident, if backups take too long to restore, you may as well not have them.
Re:Repositories held for ransom by using valid credentials
by GL-pharrison on Saturday May 04, 2019 @03:12PM
(#19828562)
I agree, the longer it takes to recover the less valuable the backups are. However, in this context where we're restoring individual repo's (and all the metadata baggage involved) it's much different than a DB restore or other disaster recovery/prevention mechanisms.
The per-repo restore time today is not where it should be. We're working to speed this up so we can help users recover and get back to a productive state quickly.
Re:Repositories held for ransom by using valid credentials
by zifnab06 on Saturday May 04, 2019 @05:47PM
(#19829589)
Does support have the ability to restore keeparound refs? Internally (at least as of late 10 series), anything show in the UI (ie, merge requests) is also copied to refs/keeparound/sha1, which isn't presented to users.
I know, back up everything at least twice. But still, when somebody loses one of your copies, they don’t get to say “it’s cool, no data was lost, you have other copies, right?”