Yes, what Boeing is saying is that MCAS, being designed to force the new plane follow the flight envelope of the old plane
1/ wasn't an anti-stall system
2/ and therefore wasn't a "security" feature (and therefore, it was completely ok to sell upgrades to that system as expensive options)
During a recent interview, Boeing CEO repeatedly said that no specific training was necessary on MCAS because MCAS is part of the whole plane, and when you're flying the MAX you're using MCAS.
This is indeed the problem: they couldn't even consider MCAS failing -- even as a thought experiment, because if MCAS fails, the MAX isn't a 737 anymore!
It looks like they locked themselves up into an alternative reality that they couldn't escape, until planes started crashing into the ground.
A bit tongue in cheek, but it's been shown that, when MCAS fails, the 737 MAX can't really be called a plane.
Actually, there is: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ai2HmvAXcU0 "This Boeing 777 wing was tested to destruction, finally breaking at one fifty four percent of the designed limit load."
It always amazes me how software and IT people in general assume that other industries are just as crappy in their processes.
That said, I do actually believe that this speaks in favor of Boeing to the extent that that is still possible after all that came out so far: the fact that they did not alert their own test pilots proves to a certain degree that they did not believe the change was a major one or worth mentioning. It would have been a worse signal if they had alerted their test pilots to the change but then failed to notify their customers, this is at least consistent with their narrative that they did not see the change as a major one.