Browsers can only protect against malicious websites and malicious extensions. They can't protect against malware. Even without any cert problems, malware on your machine can modify the browser executable/process to insert whatever code it wants.

With this reduced threat model, it's easy to simply keep existing pre-installed extensions available, and disable updates. Your only problem is if a pre-installed extension is malicious or has a vulnerability, it will remain.

> Presumably because how would it differentiate between a legit "already installed" extension with a signature that cannot be verified, and an extension installed by malware that also cannot be verified?

This is why a signature can also be accompanied by a trusted time stamp which can confirm that the signature was made while the certificate was valid.

This is the common way to sign all Windows software to avoid this exact kind of problem.

Yes, that implies this is a known and solved problem. It’s embarrassing for Mozilla to not have prepared for this.

If an extension was already installed, it passed the signature check at the time of installation. I'm not sure what benefits we get from periodically re-running the exact same check -- particularly when balanced against the risks of the re-checks, which are now obvious.

Personally I despise the idea of the software already on my pc being dependent on signatures stored on a remote server. I installed it and Mozilla can fuck right off. It's my responsibility to police what software is on my computer, not theirs.

According to https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19824520 the signatures are on the extensions themselves, not on a remote server.