Re:A New Way of Voting That Makes Zealotry Expensive
by gvhst on Friday May 03, 2019 @11:13PM
(#19824162)
Here is some back of the envelope math that I did:
Assume you have two groups who are each 100% focused on a cause which the other group has no opinion of.
n = people in each group
b = individual vote budget
Each Group Votes Independently: n * sqrt(b) votes
If a group colludes s.t. group A gives (1/2)b votes to group B's issue and vice versa you get: 2 * n * sqrt((1/2)b)) votes which simplifies into Sqrt(2) * n * sqrt(b).
Yet coordinating between these two groups becomes more difficult and costly, growing somewhere between n (perfect coordination) and n^2 (total decentralization). Thus, regardless of how you coordinate it will always be more expensive than the influence you gain which grows at sqrt().
Even in this simple assumption collusion becomes a negative value decision.
n = people in each group
b = individual vote budget
Each Group Votes Independently: n * sqrt(b) votes
If a group colludes s.t. group A gives (1/2)b votes to group B's issue and vice versa you get: 2 * n * sqrt((1/2)b)) votes which simplifies into Sqrt(2) * n * sqrt(b).
Yet coordinating between these two groups becomes more difficult and costly, growing somewhere between n (perfect coordination) and n^2 (total decentralization). Thus, regardless of how you coordinate it will always be more expensive than the influence you gain which grows at sqrt().
Even in this simple assumption collusion becomes a negative value decision.