But yes, publicly exposed jenkins and repos lead to the compromise, not an uncommon story unfortunately.
Perimeter - I didn't see much evidence of one existing and I didn't go probing their networks to find out.
Security tropes are real for a reason, you don't have to believe me though.
Private repos in GitHub are still publicly hosted and are orders of magnitude easier to get into than having an in perimeter repo. They've leaked before and they'll keep on leaking. GitHub even made it harder for people to fork private repos to their own public accounts but it still happens.
Can you provide some actual instances of this happening? Genuinely curious, as my org is currently migrating from enterprise to cloud.
Here's a good one from reddit: https://www.reddit.com/r/github/comments/9odnvw/someone_fork...
Its also discussed reasonably well in the infosec community. Basically GitHub is a great place to find other people's passwords and API keys.
You mean the past-tense verb led, not its metallic homonym lead. :)
Firstly having a private network for your infrastructure isn't a one stop solution for keeping attackers out.
Secondly using Github Enterprise or self hosted GitLab doesn't make up for storing secrets in Git.
Looking forwards to the proper write up.
And yes, using GHE or self hosted GitLab doesn't make up for storing secrets, but it at least keeps them out of the public eye so the effects are less brutal. Its still bad to store secrets in a code repository.
My whole point is that you can reduce risks easily, yet some people don't for some reason.
The sales-pitch for Salt (against Ansible) is ridiculous and misguided.
I just checked out the Salt SSH module and even if they used salt they would still have this issue. Then answer here is to not use the default /etc/ssh/sshd_config value of #AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2. Uncomment and remove authorized_keys2.
* no detailed analysis of how the attack was undertaken. Its not even clear how the attacker managed to get in (was it a publicly exposed Jenkins? vulnerable bastion? what?)
* no analysis of what the existing matrix.org security perimeter looked like or how it could be made better.
* repetition of security tropes. Use VPN. Use Github Enterprise (wait wtf? Why not private repos in Github?). Don't use Ansible, use salt.
Ridiculous. I was looking forward to a nice long read about how this breach was undertaken. Hugely disappointed.