How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Developer

Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by ncmncm on Thursday April 18, 2019 @07:44PM (#19695770)

Of course, that much engineering failure is not possible without even more management and regulatory failure. But documenting the engineering failures is necessary to quantify the management failures, at least until discovery in the wrongful-death lawsuits begins.

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Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by tristanstcyr on Thursday April 18, 2019 @09:24PM (#19696282)

I find that engineering vs management is not a very useful discussion point. Management is composed of engineers too and engineers are responsible for the output of their work. Production of something that doesn't work is an engineering failure.

It's depressing that everyone went along with this. Clearly there's a lack of impartial checks and balances in the process.

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Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by ReGenGen on Friday April 19, 2019 @02:06AM (#19697427)

I believe Boeing's shift from an "Engineering Culture" to a "Corporate Political Culture" is the root of the issue. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/book-... https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2013/01/21/what-we...

Boeing executives shifted focus from engineering to cost-cutting, outsourcing, and moving production & HQ to gain political influence. Moving Corporate HQ from Seattle was to insulate executives from engineering and increase political leverage in DC.

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Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by TheOtherHobbes on Friday April 19, 2019 @03:47AM (#19697793)

If you're an engineering-led company, putting MBAs in charge of it will kill it - and probably a lot of other people too.

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