How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Developer

Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by acqq on Thursday April 18, 2019 @06:57PM (#19695520)

> A sixth was that, besides comparing redundant sensors, it could have compared what the other flight computer thought it should be doing.

If you mean AoA sensors, AFAIK, there was absolutely no redundancy at all the way MCAS was designed. Exactly one sensor was ever used for MCAS. And last time I've read the Boeing's reported coming software changes, they wanted to keep it so, but just to add the notification to the pilot when the sensors disagree.

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Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by ncmncm on Thursday April 18, 2019 @07:49PM (#19695801)

Comparing sensors and comparing judgment of the other computer were both things they could have done, that they utterly failed to do, in both cases.

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Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by acqq on Friday April 19, 2019 @05:09AM (#19698075)

Because their main premise was that they are selling the "same old" plane, and any change in any workflow would make obvious it is not.

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