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Re:Mysterious safety-tampering malware infects a second site by thesimp on Wednesday April 10, 2019 @05:26PM (#19628957)
The airgap question comes up every time an industrial system is attacked. The thing is that these days all systems are connected via several layers to the outside world. Because a modern oil refinery is of no use if you cannot track what product is being made at that moment. And the people tracking the data are often in completely different locations or even different countries.

The main line of defense is these days is "layers of an onion" network with (physical) controls such that data easily can get out to a higher layer but that it is very difficult to get in from a higher layer back down into a deeper layer.

A completely airgapped network is not practical anymore because the alternative is even worse: nobody wants to have dozens or 100ths of operators, maintenance engineers and 3rd party contractors running around the facility with usb sticks because there is no network to move stuff around. If you have a network then you can control where the data comes into your network, who copies the data to where and what data is visible for which user.

Re:Mysterious safety-tampering malware infects a second site by waste_monk on Wednesday April 10, 2019 @09:23PM (#19630304)
It constantly horrifies me that they don't use data diodes for this systems like this.

Let data flow one way from the secure industrial equipment out to the general use network for monitoring, but you'd still have to go to a machine on the secure side to make any changes.

Re:Mysterious safety-tampering malware infects a second site by justwalt on Thursday April 11, 2019 @02:33AM (#19631694)
This seems to be the best solution by far.