This also removes the disincentives around making property improvements. It makes little sense for cities to penalize people for renovating and improving property.
It also adds healthy competition among landlords/owners and encourages higher density in places where land value & demand is high.
In such an environment, switching to a land value tax is regressive.
A general tax credit could be distributed more fairly and would allow seniors to choose to spend it on rent, but also allow the option of moving somewhere different/cheaper, or spend it on a greater want/need.
The land value tax is still important as it incentivizes development and density where it makes sense. Landlords cannot sit back and rent-seek. If developers around them are making the area nicer, they will soon be priced out unless they follow suit. Similarly, as demand & density increase, area tax revenues also increase allowing for the building of infrastructure to handle the higher density.
General / flat tax schemes for situations like this tend to be regressive.
> Landlords cannot sit back and rent-seek. If developers around them are making the area nicer, they will soon be priced out unless they follow suit.
So, separately from the ghost town situation in Jerusalem, there's a phenomenon in Tel Aviv where there is undeveloped beachfront property worth literally hundreds of millions of dollars with some one-story house sitting on the land and falling apart. If you delve into the reasons why it hasn't been sold to a developer, you find out that the original purchasers have several generations of inheritors, with ownership divided among thousands of people. Because those thousands of people can't unanimously agree on who to sell their shares to and at what price, the land sits undeveloped, and the situation gets worse over time as the current owners have children of their own and the current owners' miniscule shares get divided even further. Many of these properties are locked up in court battles with family members trying to sue to force the sale of shares by some third or fourth cousin they barely know.
When people are literally looking at hundreds of thousands of dollars for their ownership stake, and they still can't sell, how is the financial incentive established by the LVT any different in terms of being able to bring about a result in getting the land developed?
Thus if you have your secondary unoccupied residence in that zone, then it would be a zoning violation so you must live in it or rent it out.
Furthermore, even if you could figure out a way to set up zoning regulations to achieve these aims, how would you penalize violations? Fines are just factored into the cost of ownership, just like the taxes on empty apartments.
Jerusalem tried this. Lots of apartments owned by wealthy foreign landlords who only occupy the apartments once or twice a year, if that, on holiday, transforming large sections of the city into ghost neighborhoods.
https://www.timesofisrael.com/jerusalem-ups-ghost-apartment-...
It hasn't worked. Odds are that the tax on empty apartments simply isn't high enough. So the question is, how do you determine the tax rate to make it adequately "crippling" to absentee owners? Should it be some factor of the property's value? Won't matter, it'll be factored in as part of the cost. Should it be some kind of wealth tax? Not really possible, since as foreign owners, most of their wealth is located abroad.
It makes sense on paper but it's fairly difficult to carry out in practice.