Classically, we understand our neurological arrangement to be a function of each last instant's without discomfort. It's another thing entirely to consider how we might have been arranged from wildly different previous states.
Although there's no compelling evidence to support it, neither is there a way to disprove it, I'm afraid.
Of course, it's not particularly useful to consider the Boltzmann brain version of yourself because a Boltzmann brain's decisions don't have any consequences. Time is better spent considering decisions by the consequences of the human taking them. Maybe this implies that you should choose to define "yourself" to refer to both your mental state combined with the ability to make decisions of consequence, and then you can safely disregard the strange kinship you may have with a Boltzmann brain. Though now this line of thought invites interesting questions about how to define what makes a decision consequential, and what exactly makes human decisions consequential...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boltzmann_brain