Wonder why didn't they trim up more when they turned the electric trim back on. On the surface it appears that was their last chance to salvage the situation.
Prehaps they didn't think it moved at all and decided they stablizer was jammed. 5 seconds later, MCAS commands down and because that's in the same direction as the aerodynamic forces it moved a lot easier.
Yeah, from my computer screen I can wonder why they didn’t sit on that ANU switch hard and long. But in that cockpit Boeing had already sealed their fate.
How does anyone expect pilots to run through these crazy scenarios and perform flawlessly unless they have done it in a simulator many times?
But a whole lot of social and political engineering was put into ensuring that simulator drills of emergency scenarios related to this system would not be part of any pilot's training.
For specific training to be reqired I assume it would need to be made a different certification entirely? Is that even a plausible scenario that this could change?
> At 05:40:35, the First-Officer called out “stab trim cut-out” two times. Captain agreed and First Officer confirmed stab trim cut-out.
[...]
> At 05:41:46, the Captain asked the First-Officer if the trim is functional. The First-Officer has replied that the trim was not working and asked if he could try it manually. The Captain told him to try.
> At 05:41:54, the First-Officer replied that it is not working.
[...]
> At 05:43:04, the Captain asked the First Officer to pitch up together and said that pitch is not enough.
> At 05:43:11, about 32 seconds before the end of the recording, at approximately 13,4002 ft, two momentary manual electric trim inputs are recorded in the ANU direction. The stabilizer moved in the ANU direction from 2.1 units to 2.3 units.
> At 05:43:20, approximately five seconds after the last manual electric trim input, an AND automatic trim command occurred and the stabilizer moved in the AND direction from 2.3 to 1.0 unit in approximately 5 seconds. The aircraft began pitching nose down. Additional simultaneous aft column force was applied, but the nose down pitch continues, eventually reaching 40° nose down. The stabilizer position varied between 1.1 and 0.8 units for the remainder of the recording.
Seems this debunks the initial implicit commentary how this was due to 'third world' pilots and couldn't happen in the US.