Lack of redundancies on Boeing 737 MAX baffles some involved in developing it

Re:Lack of redundancies on Boeing 737 MAX baffles some invol... by taneq on Tuesday April 02, 2019 @11:31PM (#19560521)

I've had to do a bit of functional safety stuff recently and one of the things they focus on are "common cause failures" (of which this is a perfect example - if one of the sensors freezes, the others are likely to do so as well). If you want to be sure something works, it's not enough to just have two or three copies of the same system. You have to have redundancy in manner of operation as well.

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Re:Lack of redundancies on Boeing 737 MAX baffles some invol... by inamberclad on Wednesday April 03, 2019 @01:56AM (#19561105)

To be specific, I'd call that functional redundancy, versus hardware redundancy. Be able to get the same thing done in different ways.

NASA's Genesis mission was bit by this a while back. It had redundant parachute sequencers for a sample return capsule, but they were all assembled identically and with the G-sensors backwards. Consequently, they all failed in exactly the same way.

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