This practice, fortunately or unfortunately depending on who you ask, effectively normalized deviance, and short-circuited the protection offered by that airworthyness regulation. It went from being clearly spelled out to "or equivalent level of safety" which opens the door to all sorts of workarounds.
The alpha vanes need to be a high-priority maintenance item. They may also need to be redesigned/augmented such that they can be hardened against typical failure states, or subjected to in-flight remediation/diagnostics and graceful failover.
That isn't easy from my understanding. Doing something like hardening vs. freezing would require some form of heating element, which would potentially effect the calibration of the sensor while active, and increase maintenance complexity. Adding some sort of self contained calibration unit to the sensor could work too, however, the more complexity built into that, the more costly it becomes.
There is a point of diminishing returns, and I do think the plane can be rendered safe with MCAS and pilot retraining.
Unfortunately, that will still come bundled with an aircraft losing its airworthyness rating on Stab Trim cutout.
Safety in an aircraft means getting passengers to their destination without injury or loss of life. Boeing failed here - blame lack of training, single sensor dependence or software if you like but there was certainly a failure.
Now no one really cares if MCAS is problematic - any solution needs to resolve the underlying fault.