Everyone, you need to drive the Ford 35 Mustang. It's not the fastest car but it's pretty fast. If you strap a trailer on the back then sure it now loses all it's maneuverability but it's now a truck, right? So we don't need trucks any more.
Since it's invisible you don't need any combat capability, unless you load it out with 8 pylons and now it's not invisible any more, so now it does need to outfly the enemy. But it can't because it needs to carry all this load.
It needs to take off and land vertically which means it needs a small cross section but it needs to be able to have a high wing load to turn so it needs a large cross section.
It needs to do close air support but it can't get close. It needs to be slow but it also needs to be fast.
It needs to be a bomber and have long range, but needs to be a fighter and have high performance (or energy maneuverability).
It's what Boyd warned everyone about during the last generation, you need to avoid mutli role aircraft as they're not good at anything.
Like the F-16 or the F-15E? Hillaker said he'd have designed the F-16 differently(more akin to the F-16XL) if he had known it was going to be multi-role.
Eh, if it went into production as they had envisioned, it would have been built only to F-104 kind of numbers. By compromising a little on the air to air aspect, they gained enormously in the air to ground aspect and overall utility. Most of the sorties have been air to ground for a good awhile now.
These are the design constraints. Really it should be 2 or 3 different, almost certainly cheaper, aircraft.
For someone like the Army, it seems like a drone version of the A-10, which drops a lot of the pilot armor for increased munitions and dwell time, would be a decisive factor in CAS.
If you look at say, the ambush on American forces in Syria by the Wagner group, substantial amounts of fire were provided by helicopters and AC-130s.
So I'm just lost at how a plane which can reach target faster than a helicopter, but provide similar close in support doesn't have a role in such engagements.
That's not to say that stealth penetration, ECW, and targeted strikes aren't important -- eg, providing openings in IAD, hitting fortified targets quickly, etc. Just that given how things with Wagner went, it seems like long-dwell, high munition count CAS is useful.
The issue right now isn't with loiter time or payload. Range is the enemy more than anything right now. We fight a global conflict and providing resources anywhere at anytime is alot harder than it sounds. Making A-10s into drones doesn't solve any particular problem. Once the Army fully realizes future vertical lift we'll have a better picture of what "local" CAS will look like moving forward. Right now we team 64s with UAVs all wholly owned and operated by the Army to project force locally.
Response time is key. An F-16 hauling ass from Al Udeid will give me more than an A-10 hauling ass from Al Udeid. Low risk precision is key. A UCAV at altitude raining hate in the from of hellfires presents very low risk to the asset and a great deal of precision for the troops on the ground. The A-10 can act great as a delivery platform, but it is slow and incredibly vulnerable. Time matters for those troops in contact, and providing fast precision is the key ingredient in CAS right now. Sustainment comes in the form of larger platforms such as the B-1 and the B-52. In a low to moderate risk environment you can start throwing in Army assets and special mission stuff like the AC-130. Air power is built as a stack, and the idea to to provide quick reaction to troops in contact with precision munitions. Bring in ISR platforms (or already have them in place) at altitude to develop the battlefield. Finally, sustain air power with larger platforms or locally employed assets (think short range long loiter) such as AH-64s, AH-6s, DAPS, etc.
The reason why the A-10 doesn't have a KEY role in all of this is because after decades at war, lessons were learned. Now the A-10 isn't SUPER BAD at CAS, we've just evolved. An F-35 will do the job just well in that it provides that critical speed, range, payload, precision and all with an amazing capability set. If we ever need to destroy battalions of tanks en-mass with zero risk of effective counter air or anti-air, I'm sure we'll see the A-10 again.
In terms of Khasham, you're also ignoring the dozen or so sorties flown that day by F-22s, F-15s, and B-52s that provided probably more than 80% of the total payload. Not to mention the many un-named ISR and UCAV platforms that probably stayed in the stack for the better part of that week. Going back to the "stack" mentioned above.
Why would the A-10 (Or a light attack aircraft) be hauling ass from there instead of already being in the air near the AO since it has a lot more fuel and loiter time (and lower cost per flight hour)? Or being closer since they can launch from more austere airfields.
Also, I have read articles:
* Quoting JTACs saying dialling in the fast movers afer their arrival takes a lot longer than a slow-mover in a near-contact situation which can be a serious issue (and large removes the "haul ass" 8-minute rule advantage)
* Quoting army captains saying the loiter time is so low after the fast movers have arrived that enemy forces basically learned to stop the attack for 30 minutes then resume after the fast-mover has had to go to the nearest tanker to refuel.
I can maybe see the F-35's sensor suite helping with the first one but not the second (Unless it is so good that it can reliably find targets on the ground even when the JTAC cannot be sure).
Or when I read about Special forces literally having to do end-runs around official policy to get some A-29s to support them because the existing kit wasn't doing the job.
I am not an "A-10 forever" type but I find the "F-35 solves EVERYTHING" crowd to be a bit over-zealous and I have read enough about issues with the Airforce (brass especially) and its relationship with the CAS/COIN role to make me wonder about their ability to evaulate without bias.
> Why would the A-10 (Or a light attack aircraft) be hauling ass from there instead of already being in the air near the AO since it has a lot more fuel and loiter time (and lower cost per flight hour)? Or being closer since they can launch from more austere airfields.
That's a bad way to frame it, I could just argue that a bunch of B-1s should have been at altitude already as well. I guess we'll prop up multiple airfields in Syria because .... well we don't have to, we'll just use other equally as good assets that can be rapidly fielded from regional bases. It simplifies cost, provides quick and effective fire all at a much lower risk. Ultimately the ground force commander builds their own stack and helps arrange and field assets before any major operation. In a low threat environment, hell yes have a bunch of A-10s in the stack ready to rock. But what about some ODA in Nigeria that randomly gets ambushed? That's how we need to be talking about CAS.
> Quoting JTACs saying dialling in the fast movers afer their arrival takes a lot longer than a slow-mover in a near-contact situation which can be a serious issue (and large removes the "haul ass" 8-minute rule advantage).
"Quoting JTACs" is like quoting the private news network in my eyes.
> Quoting army captains saying the loiter time is so low after the fast movers have arrived that enemy forces basically learned to stop the attack for 30 minutes then resume after the fast-mover has had to go to the nearest tanker to refuel.
I wouldn't say that the loiter time is what led to that outcome. Being all holed up in a COP on a mountain side isn't the best place to be in the first place. That's why local CAS must also come into the picture somewhere if you plan to sustain operations.
> Or when I read about Special forces literally having to do end-runs around official policy to get some A-29s to support them because the existing kit wasn't doing the job.
Special mission stuff will always be special mission stuff. We still have OV-10s doing high speed shit in Iraq. That doesn't mean we should build more OV-10s. Tailored solutions are just that.
Edit:
> Making A-10s into drones doesn't solve any particular problem.
Just wanted to call out -- it actually does solve one problem, and one I've heard expressed as a concern, which is the potential loss of pilots involved with low-flying, slow CAS aircraft, such as the A-10. It also substantially changes the performance requirements when you're not trying to safely house a pilot -- fuel capacity, electronics, lighter or smaller craft (if we're talking future planes), etc.
Hence the reason for my suggestion: it shifts the risk envelope in terms of sending them as CAS, while offering a distinct platform from say, Predator style drones, with relatively lighter armaments.
Let me just conclude by saying my information on military hardware largely comes from Wikipedia, may not include various platforms that haven't been widely publicized, and certainly doesn't include accurate information on combat.
Again, I appreciate you taking the time to talk.
Aircraft peashooters aren't strong enough to shoot down tanks nowadays.
If you're defining CAS as dropping overkill PGMs from 30,000ft in clear skies.
But that form of CAS is unique to the 'last war'. How will the F-35 fare in Central Europe where 90% of days are overcast and media coverage means you can't just throw a 500lber into a block of flats to suppress a sniper.
> So I told you what this soldier wants, and what the Airforce is doing.
The soldier wants the target suppressed ASAP, in any weather and with minimal risk to friendly force. The Air Force is following its usual tactic of appearing to do just enough to fulfil the soldier's needs so that it can keep the Army away from armed fixed-wing.
Unique like how the A-10 has been operating in such uncontested airspace of the 'last war'? An SU-25 was downed by a MANPADS last year in Syria. The A-10 is tough and highly survivable, but the case of not being hit in the first place has some merit.
Even on an overcast day you could still throw a munition through a window of a building, I don't know why you think that cloud coverage diminishes our capability.
http://jockopodcast.com/2017/04/05/69-the-real-top-gun-battl...
(I mean, that's a source of lots of the problems with the program)
A plane different than the F-35 doing CAS doesn't have to be the aging A-10.
That reminds of a talk I heard by a historian who pointed out that the Sherman tank was actually a better tank than its reputation suggests. While a bigger gun and more armor could have helped, the tank commands actually turned down bigger guns (because they hadn't yet seen tanks that needed them) and providing sufficient armor to actually stop the weapon fire being trained on them may not have been possible with the logistical constraints of the US Army.
CAS is more than just "staying", if anything it has a lot more to do with "getting there". We're very good at getting a lot of shit down range, what gets there QUICKLY makes the difference to those on the ground.
What's really interesting is looking at the data; the majority of CAS missions in Afghanistan were performed by the B-1, hardly what comes to mind when you picture that aircraft. But it has high speed, packs a ton of munitions, and has the ability to persist for a long time over the battlespace.
Loiter time isn't as big of a variable as people make it out to be. We'll just throw more assets into the mix. What matters is getting there fast to be able to actually impact the fight in a meaningful way.
there is no aircraft on the planet that provides close air support as well as the A10. not even most military brass that want to get rid of the A10 will admit otherwise.
troops want the a10 because they dont want a friggen bomb dropped on their head, not because of nostalgia.
"there is no aircraft on the planet that provides close air support as well as the A10"
Apache drivers love their guns, don't say that too loudly. Those Marine AH-1 guys hate their lives so they might not care so much you have that opinion. Those Air Force F-15, F-16, F-22 and B-2 drivers might however be a tad salty that despite the fact they are the ones present at those troop in contact missions most of the time they don't get any love because of LUL BRRRRT.
Troops if anything don't want the A-10 because they don't want a friggen strafe ran over them when they could've had a JDAM. But hey, BRRRRRT
In your opinion, does this article accurately reflect the current limitations of the A-10, and list useful enhancements of what a "Warthog 2.0" should have? For example:
> Because CAS missions often take place at very low altitudes and low airspeeds — anywhere from 150 knots to 300 knots — the aircraft must be able to perform a two-G sustained turn at a rate of five degrees per second with a turn radius of no more than 2,000 feet.
> The instantaneous turn rate — that is, how quickly a plane can wheel around in the first few seconds of a maneuver — would have to be better than 20 degrees per second while pulling six Gs. The aircraft must also be able to remain less than one mile from a target between attacks while pulling no more than two Gs — except for the roll-in to the attack and the time it’s leaving the area.
[...]
> The A-10 cannot take off at its maximum weight in places like Afghanistan and must either off-load weapons or fuel. The next-generation aircraft must be able climb out of a runway at maximum gross weight at a rate of the 4,000 feet per minute at a density altitude of 20,000 feet. Further, it must be able to operate out of a 3,000-foot runway at sea-level with a full fuel load and an internal gun. Ideally, it should be able to operate out of austere 1,500-foot runways.
> A cruise speed of at least 360 knots is desirable, the pilots said. Initially, the group believed that it would be best for a next-gen aircraft to cruise at 480 knots with a dash speed of 540 knots. However, with Sprey’s input, the team came to the conclusion that such a requirement would be aerodynamically incompatible with a tight turn radius at low airspeed.
[...]
> The prospective next-generation Warthog replacement needs to have a minimum combat radius of 150 nautical miles with at least four hours on station time with internal fuel, the pilot explains.
* https://warisboring.com/what-will-the-next-a-10-warthog-look...
* https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/mcsallys-case-let...
The data from the war in Afghanistan paints a pretty good picture of capability versus perception. The vast majority of the responses to troops-in-contact came in the form of precision munitions from F-16s or F-15s. What the "troops" want is not a good variable in understanding what the best method of providing CAS is. Everyone wants the A-10, it's sexy. The reality on the ground is that even in a low threat environment such as Afghanistan the A-10 doesn't nearly do the job as good as an F-16 for a number of reasons which I won't get into in a public forum.
The Airforce vision of CAS is precision munitions from both manned and un-manned platforms that present very little risk to both the operators of the platform and the infrastructure that support them. It would be a significant de-evolution of our capability as a military to continue to operate the A-10 purley on nostalgia and public perception of its' capabilities. I don't expect the public at large to look at this situation with nuisance or data, but let's use common sense if anything. The reason why the Afghan Airforce is operating A-29s and armed C-208Bs has much more to do with cost and sustainability than it does to do with effectiveness. In fact you can find multiple articles of Afghan brass complaining about how what we are giving them isn't particularly well suited to the mission they are expected to sustain. A couple of tool boxes and spare PT6 parts will keep that fleet flying for a couple of years. I don't see them really providing a meaningful impact on the battlefield however.
Being close to the ground is the Army's mission and they do it really well. Adding a couple gunned turboprops won't change anything on the ground today or tomorrow. We are training and developing doctrine for a near-peer threat. We've been focused on COIN too long, and developing budgets and technology for yesterday's conflicts is exactly what set us back in the early days of the GWOT. So consider for a moment that the F-35, despite it's many setbacks and runaway budget might actually do the CAS mission quite well. I'll take the laser guided 500LB bomb over a spray of Hyrda rockets when some asshole starts throwing IDF my way. By the time we procure, field, and properly employ something like the A-29 it's basically going to be limited to a low threat environment scout attack role. Hey doesn't the Army do that??!!
So I told you what this soldier wants, and what the Airforce is doing. Hopefully that's good enough.