I personally wonder if there is potentially a thermal cut-off on the trim motor which could have been activated by this trimming and re-triming. Or even an outright failure of some part of the system.
Also notable is that engines spool-up about the same point to what looks like full takeoff thrust.
They must have identified an issue just after going flaps 0 because there is no other reason to go to back to flaps 5 (which incidentally disables MCAS). Why on earth they didn't drop flaps again and head back to the airport is a bit of a mystery to me.
I can't imagine the Captain handing control of a aircraft which was obviously a handful to a co-pilot and then looking straight down at the checklist, surely he'd have given guidance about the trim and waited to ensure the co-pilot was handling the aircraft?
In about the last minute of that recording, the pattern changes: the pilot trim inputs decreased and became much shorter, and the stick forces changed from going up and down to a sustained, high, back-force.
The article says that near the end, the captain handed over control to the 1st officer so he could look for answers. I am speculating wildly here, but could that coincide with the change in the pattern of the pilot's responses? Could it be that the 1st officer did not attempt to re-trim, or did not do it completely? Did he try to trim manually, but perhaps could not because of the load on the stabilizer? [1]. IIRC, according to Dominic Gates, it would only take two cycles of MCAS intervention until the stabilizer had reached a point where full nose-up elevator could not keep the airplane level.
The chart was published in one of Dominic Gates' Seattle Times articles, but I am not in a position to find it right now...
[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19400157