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Re:Breaking AES-128 in realtime, no ciphertext required by tptacek on Wednesday November 24, 2010 @02:25PM (#1938285)
You have to be on the same machine as the software doing the encryption. It works in roughly the same way that Daniel Bernstein, Eran Tromer, Onur Aciiçmez, and Colin Percival's (independently discovered) attacks work; you run a tight loop measuring memory accesses for cache perturbation, and postprocess the measurements to guess key bits. It has nothing to do with AES - the - algorithm.

The paper is interesting (they used an artificial neural network to filter the measurements), but the results aren't ultra-surprising; I think everyone expects more side channels to be discovered on x86 hardware in the coming years, especially since much of the microarchitecture is undocumented. (Note: this paper targets a very old processor, which probably improved their results).

The biggest issue with this branch of side channel study --- an issue not mentioned in the paper --- is that "getting on the same machine as an encryption process" is much less hard than it sounds in 2010: many encryption processes run on VMs inside hosting providers, where the cost of situating an attacker on the same metal as the target might be as low as $20.

But, long story short: this isn't the crypto attack you should be most worried about. My understanding is that OpenSSL has pushed back on fixing much more straightforward timing channels than this. There are remote attacks that are still worth attention.

Re:Breaking AES-128 in realtime, no ciphertext required by caf on Wednesday November 24, 2010 @07:06PM (#1938913)
This particular implementation of the timing attack uses the fact that OpenSSL is used as a shared library, so that the (read-only) lookup table is mapped to the same physical pages in every process using the library. That wouldn't be true in the "same-metal-different-VM" attack model (but it seems like it should be possible to extend the attack to that scenario).
Re:Breaking AES-128 in realtime, no ciphertext required by tptacek on Wednesday November 24, 2010 @07:14PM (#1938923)
Yup. My bad.
Re:Breaking AES-128 in realtime, no ciphertext required by JoachimSchipper on Wednesday November 24, 2010 @03:54PM (#1938519)
E.g. http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~hovav/dist/cloudsec.pdf shows that the whole "crypto in the cloud" idea isn't so hot.

Still, the speed with which this attack runs is impressive.

Re:Breaking AES-128 in realtime, no ciphertext required by InclinedPlane on Wednesday November 24, 2010 @09:30PM (#1939162)
When browsers have been updated to have "good and proper" high performance byte-code VMs fully integrated we can look forward to these sorts of attacks becoming possible through merely viewing a web page or component (say, an ad served by a 3rd party).