What is the correct action though? The root cause of the first crash is understood to be a complete lack of training on a single aspect of the flight control system in a particular set of circumstances (one that happens to occur in the most dangerous part of the flight envelope). From what I understand about this issue, the correct action is to institute an immediate crash course (pun intended?) to train pilots on how to recognize and manage the actions of this subsystem unless further, currently unspeculated issues with the sensors and software are discovered.
>(T)he risk of grounding planes is operational inconvenience
I think you're overlooking the risks involved in adding significant pressure to flight schedulers (who have to get planes in place to make up for missed routes), maintenance crews (who have to provide more flight hours for the remaining fleet to make up for the missing planes), and pilots (who will have to fly something different than what they've recently been flying).
Think of how many opportunities for a mistake to happen would arise from changing something like the route, time, and (sometimes) vehicle used for the daily commute by every worker in a 2,000 person company. Tighter timetables, increased flight hours on the remaining fleet, and the need for pilot's to shake the rust off their skillset flying an airframe they haven't been in for a while are all significant risk factors that have played a part in the vast majority of flight accidents in the modern era of air travel.
I disagree. The EU grounded planes returned to their starting point, and will have to fly yet another leg: a double dose of flight risk.
How will airlines fill the gap from their MAX8 fleet? By dusting off their parked planes. Why are they parked? They could be lemons or reduced safety (e.g. Minimim Equipment Lists).
Or by deferring maintenance, which is done to keep planes safe.
Health care is trying to reduce its unnecessary testing habit: if they cost money and time without value, then resources are taken away from other life-saving interventions.
Europe will probably be fine. Unfortunately here in the states, the Airlines colluded with "capacity discipline" [1]. If you've been on a US flight recently, you'll notice that a whole plane canceled would require another entire plane to be found. And since airlines don't seem to invest too much into their workforce, well they just don't have the extra captains and crew to run extra-hour flights late into the evening either.
1: https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-antitrust-airlines-la...
An up-start airline cutting fares can become ramen-profitable much quicker than ever before.
Signed, a Canadian that salivates at the pricing the American consumers can get for domestic flights.
Is it possible there is a safety risk to grounding the 737 Max that outweighs the risk of allowing it to fly?
If there are other airliners that can be put into service to take up the slack, though, they’re very unlikely to be more dangerous.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aviation_safety#Transport_comp...
Also, note the final entry in that table: Space Shuttle. Per-kilometer, it's hardly that much more dangerous than driving. But per Journey....
The fatality rate per journey for US airlines over the last ten years is approximately 0.14 per billion journeys, several hundred times better than the number from your link. (Roughly 700 million journeys per year on average, one fatality during that period.)
Cars have gotten safer too, but not nearly as much.
The farther back you look, the less noise you get in your data, but you also incorporate data that's less and less relevant to the current environment. Ten years seems like a decent cutoff, although it is a cutoff that happens to have had a wild swing recently.
My original point still stands if you want to take the data back a bit further: even if you include Colgan, the resulting number is way below the 117 per billion listed on that Wikipedia page.
EDIT: Added more weasel words.
If the argument is that this is just about dollars and inconvenience to the airline, what would a 737 Max crash, now, cost Southwest in law suits and reputation? Maybe SWA is weighing this against the likelihood of another flight 1380 type incident.
As for financial damages, it’s human nature to underestimate risks that have a large cost to mitigate. Even if grounding the Max is more cost effective, I wouldn’t be confident in them reaching that conclusion.
Instead of Boeing publishing information about the systems and requiring pilots to receive training in the new models, the pilots themselves have essentially come up with their own pilot training course, and used the tragedies plastered across global news as the change notification system.
Of course, over the last 10 years or so the FAA has delegated much of the approval process to the corporations themselves. Perhaps the system really is rotten?
The FAA absolutely does consider this in general. For example, this is a major reason they don’t require child safety seats: their analysis is that the extra expense would shift some travel to cars and ultimately kill more kids than it saves. https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?conte...
As for two crashes not being significant, I don’t buy it. Against such a low background rate (2017 recorded zero fatalities across all jet airliners of all types, for example), two crashes of the same type in a few months is huge. Six years ago, two non-fatal battery fires aboard 787s was enough for the FAA to ground the type until a fix could be made. In hindsight, that seems to have been the correct action. This 787 Max problem appears to be far more severe.
We believe there may be an MCAS issue due to the preliminary Lion investigation but we haven’t seen it in our fleet and our pilots are confident they are prepared for it anyway. We don’t yet have enough data to draw any conclusion on the Ethiopian crash and so we’re currently treating it as an independent incident and a single incident doesn’t warrant grounding the plane.
Would I personally feel safer on a new Southwest Max or on an older Southwest 737? I don’t know. Statistically, there have been no 737 Max crashes in the US.
They're often far enough it's impractical to drive, and at least in the European market, trains are always a more expensive, but available alternative. If the FAA took action, in the US people would probably just postpone trips unless they had the personal days to drive instead (or a lot of personal days to AmTrak instead).
Most people will be shuffled onto larger flights to hubs with connections via smaller aircraft; so they'll be switching to airplanes with proven safety records. It increases demand for the seats and may raise cost, but safety would actually go up if it turns out there is a problem with the 737-max8.
I can’t help but draw the parallel to anti-vax logic: ”if it’s at all possible that my child might be seriously injured from a vaccine, then I must avoid vaccines!”
Setting a standard of “any risk is unacceptable because the downside risk is absolute” is also incorrect.
The FAA and NTSB are rightly very conservative and cautious with respect to approving new designs, since the risk of premature approval is high and the harm of waiting a bit longer for more information is low. But this is the opposite scenario - the risk of grounding planes is operational inconvenience, versus the harm of another plane crash.
The correct move here is to act even if they think the certainty is low.