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Re:Breaking AES-128 in realtime, no ciphertext required by MikeCapone on Wednesday November 24, 2010 @12:54PM (#1938023)
Anybody can explain to us non-cryptographers if:

1) This is legit?

2) This can work in the real-world and not just in some very specific lab conditions?

Re:Breaking AES-128 in realtime, no ciphertext required by mey on Wednesday November 24, 2010 @01:03PM (#1938043)
The first sentence mentions this as a side channel attack, which is a legitimate attack method and applies to most algorithms, not just AES. Most crypto packages guard against this attack one way or another. This is one of the reasons you do not implement your own cryptography solution without understanding all the details, as any weakness can cause a complete compromise.

Further reading. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side_channel_attack

Also this article title is slightly mis-leading, but not entirely.

Re:Breaking AES-128 in realtime, no ciphertext required by eru on Wednesday November 24, 2010 @01:17PM (#1938090)
Side channel attacks can become pretty funny, e.g. listening to the sounds your computer makes.
Re:Breaking AES-128 in realtime, no ciphertext required by mtigas on Wednesday November 24, 2010 @02:22PM (#1938273)
In case anyone is wondering (via Wikipedia):

In 2004, Adi Shamir and Eran Tromer demonstrated that it may be possible to conduct timing attacks against a CPU performing cryptographic operations by analysis of variations in its humming noise (that is, its high-frequency humming noise, not the louder low-frequency humming of its cooling fan). http://people.csail.mit.edu/tromer/acoustic/

Re:Breaking AES-128 in realtime, no ciphertext required by JoachimSchipper on Wednesday November 24, 2010 @04:01PM (#1938534)
Some people take long-exposure photographs in a dark box. Yes, really.

Of course, electron microscopes and precisely-aimed laser pulses are more... geeky.

Re:Breaking AES-128 in realtime, no ciphertext required by Nrsolis on Wednesday November 24, 2010 @02:27PM (#1938288)
Not only is it legit but it's a kind of attack that is very closely studied because theory != practice. MOST crypto systems fail because they implement a very solid algorithm/protocol in a very bad way.

My experience has been that cryptographic systems fail in two ways:

1. Side channel attacks. 2. Key management attacks.

There is a whole conference (called CHES) which talks about ways to build/verify crypto hardware that will withstand side channel attacks and prevent the loss of keying material stored in a hardware device. It's a hard problem to get right and a lot of very paranoid people work very hard to anticipate how bad they might be at building a working cryptographic system.

Re:Breaking AES-128 in realtime, no ciphertext required by tptacek on Wednesday November 24, 2010 @02:36PM (#1938315)
I review roughly 1 cryptosystem per quarter in my practice, have been doing so for several years, and I can't think of a single system that survived as far as "I'd have to mount a side channel attack to break this". If your biggest problem is timing leaks, you win.

The stuff that breaks most cryptosystems is much more basic than "side channels" and "key management". It's using ECB mode, encrypting without a MAC, inventing your own SHA1 MAC, leaking errors, colliding IVs or nonces, failure modes that collide session keys, not checking parameters; I could go on and on.

I'd hate for people to think that side channels is the thing they have to be on the lookout for. Writing their own crypto constructions is what they need to be on the lookout for.

Re:Breaking AES-128 in realtime, no ciphertext required by Nrsolis on Wednesday November 24, 2010 @03:13PM (#1938407)
Point noted. I don't review cryptosystems for a living.

I guess my point was that most of the cryptosystems /I've/ used over the years have seen significant vulnerabilities exposed in key management and side channel attacks. Insufficient entropy for key generation is another one. That said, I probably benefit from people like you weeding out the REALLY bad implementations.

I do agree that you're likely to see a lot of extraordinarily poorly designed cryptosystems if you regularly look at work product from people who are unfamiliar with attack methodologies in general.

Re:Breaking AES-128 in realtime, no ciphertext required by tptacek on Wednesday November 24, 2010 @03:34PM (#1938462)
I work in app security, and maybe 1% of the testers I know (I know a lot of testers) are familiar with crypto attack methodologies. It's still a dark art. I don't know where a company that wasn't "plugged in" would ever find expertise.
Re:Breaking AES-128 in realtime, no ciphertext required by Nrsolis on Wednesday November 24, 2010 @04:37PM (#1938613)
Having your app own3d is a pretty good way to learn how NOT to do crypto.
Re:Breaking AES-128 in realtime, no ciphertext required by wglb on Wednesday November 24, 2010 @07:33PM (#1938963)
I wonder how many ways there are to NOT do crypto. To enumerate them sounds like it might be exhausting.
Re:Breaking AES-128 in realtime, no ciphertext required by js4all on Wednesday November 24, 2010 @02:22PM (#1938275)
2) The attack is possible, but only on the machine which does the encryption. So the threat is real but relatively difficult to exploit.

Anyway, the findings are spectacular because most other attacks use time-memory trade-off brute-force methods.