If the 64-bit random serial number has already provided an adequate security margin, it should be that no action needed for all existing 63-bit certificates. But it seems the choice of 64-bit here is arbitrary without good justification...
I'm curious why that's the case. A plain reading of reducing the security level from 128 to 126 bits would seem to imply the answer is yes?
I get that it’s meaningless - 4x effectively 0 is still effectively 0 - but denying the math doesn’t really help anything.
The problem here is my choice of an ambiguous word, "security". Formally speaking, the "security level" or "security claim" of a cipher is defined by the computational complexity (time/memory) of breaking it, often represented as the number of bits. so the Biclique attack indeed reduced the "security" of AES to 25% of its original claim. "Security" in a broader sense can be roughly understood as "how well a system is practically protected, under a specific threat model", in this case, the underlying details, such as this minor reduction to a cipher's security claim hardly matters.
I should have edited my comment to use a better word, but now it already became permanent.
If you discovered your AES key generator only created 127 bit keys, would you correct the mistake moving forward? Or go back and immediately burn everything with the old key? The difference between 2^127 and 2^128 is much, much more than 9 quintillion.