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Re:Facebook exploit – Confirm website visitor identities by supernovae on Monday March 04, 2019 @06:44PM (#19306829)
Is there something in here we're missing?

Someone finds exploit, gets the bounty, facebook fixes and we have a timeline.

Sounds like the system worked... are we looking for something else here?

Re:Facebook exploit – Confirm website visitor identities by dpwm on Monday March 04, 2019 @06:56PM (#19306897)
> are we looking for something else here?

No. But some people, myself included, are interested in this sort of thing.

It's also interesting to see the timescales of the fix. Posts like this demonstrate that the system worked, albeit perhaps a bit slower than we'd like to imagine.

Whilst the reports of bug hunting apparently within the scope of the bug bounty resulting in a legal team responding with a false dichotomy between an NDA or prosecution are particularly juicy, it's also nice to hear about the cases where that isn't the outcome.

Re:Facebook exploit – Confirm website visitor identities by paxys on Tuesday March 05, 2019 @02:52AM (#19308918)
Who is complaining about anything? It's a nice article about a neat little exploit, and the process to find it.
Re:Facebook exploit – Confirm website visitor identities by abhisuri97 on Monday March 04, 2019 @06:47PM (#19306847)
I don't think there's much to see here...it is a cool bug though that doesn't require a super high level understanding of security to figure out.

But a 6-9 month time to fix seems really long (also I would have thought a $1000 bug bounty is low for this type of exploit...but then again I'm not in this space too much to know the average rewards).

Re:Facebook exploit – Confirm website visitor identities by jcims on Monday March 04, 2019 @07:27PM (#19307081)
The thing to also keep in mind is that the bug bounty teams are typically centralized and not embedded within the product teams of the services being reported on. They certainly get prioritized attention, but there are still layers of communication to report the issue, follow up with devs or reporter if there are questions or difficulties reproducing the issue, prioritize the issue, fix the bug and deploy to prod.

Not to say that’s the way it is at Facebook, just what I’ve seen in the past.

Re:Facebook exploit – Confirm website visitor identities by DanFeldman on Monday March 04, 2019 @06:55PM (#19306893)
Being charitable here, it may be that this exploit showed a breakage in their internal API security process, or an edge case previously unhandled. Perhaps FB had to run an internal audit to find any other endpoints effected by this bug. Buggy endpoints then need to get fixed, tickets get sent out, but with a low priority because this is a low priority bug, and voilà, 6-9 months.
Re:Facebook exploit – Confirm website visitor identities by abeyer on Monday March 04, 2019 @07:03PM (#19306933)
One could also question whether they used the lure of a bounty to keep someone quiet while they let customers (aka advertisers) continue to benefit for an extra 9 months at the expense of the users.

I guess you'd have to consider Facebook's track record in terms of how charitable vs. cynical you want to be in interpreting their actions.

Re:Facebook exploit – Confirm website visitor identities by baroffoos on Monday March 04, 2019 @07:16PM (#19307008)
Couldn't facebook just provide some secret service for identifying users behind the scenes that regular devs can not access?
Re:Facebook exploit – Confirm website visitor identities by userxyz135 on Monday March 04, 2019 @06:48PM (#19306853)
It's common in the bug bounty community to write about how you found the bug and how the reporting process went.