We offer a proof that LtHash with our choice of parameters provides over 200 bits of security. You would have to read the paper for the details.
E: Ah, there it is, in the paper:
> However, Wagner [Wag02] later showed an attack on the generalized birthday problem which could be used to find collisions > for AdHash on an n-bit modulus in time O(2^(2√n)), and that the AdHash modulus needs to be greater > than 1600 bits long to provide 80-bit security. Lyubashevsky [Lyu05] and Shallue [Sha08] showed > how to solve the Random Modular Subset Sum problem (essentially equivalent to finding collisions > in AdHash) in time O(2^(n^ε)) for any ε < 1, which indicates that AdHash requires several more orders > of magnitude larger of a modulus just to provide 80-bit security.
For synchronization purposes in a trusted system, a Merkle tree based on XOR seems elegant and efficient, but I can't seem to find accessible papers on this.
If you want to use signatures over the hash as proof of data set integrity, you need two things. 1) you need to make sure that hash({a}) + hash({b}) == hash({a, b}). 2) ensure that hash() is collision resistant - in other words, it needs to be computationally infeasible to find hash(S) == hash(T), S != T for any sets S and T. We prove that LtHash with our choice of parameters has this property in the paper (which is linked from the blog post).