> You have evidence that some matter (your PC) can run Windows. The simplest hypothesis that explains this is that all matter can run Windows. Any hypothesis that posits that SOME matter can run Windows and other matter does not requires two different kinds of matter and a mechanism to switch between the two. Seems that hypothesis requires a lot more assumptions.

I don't think your rephrasing is very apt. "Some matter can run Windows" is only true because some humans configured matter into an arbitrary arrangement that we all agreed to label as "running Windows". There is no reason to speculate that all matter "runs Windows" since the definition of "running Windows" implies a specific configuration of matter.

So, you'd rather posit some mystical juju that makes matter gain consciousness, that somehow magically only happens to humans, and happens to matter when humans eat it, but yet is totally undetectable?

No I guess the parent's point is consciousness is inherent to all things. But it's just that it needs some minimal amount of biological configuration for it to manifest in a way that is meaningfully observable.

Which explain things like eating food(above minimal configuration) and death(Some cells die, failing the minimal configuration criteria).

Not all matter has to fend for itself in the environment. This constraint leads to evolution and consciousness. It's not magical, just self replicating.

All true and consistent. "All matter can run Windows" is indeed the simplest explanation. It's wrong, but still the simplest, per Occam's Razor, as CuriouslyC pointed out.

Occam's Razor does not abide false explanations.

>Requires two different kinds of matter (conscious and not)

This is just smuggling in the conclusion. We observe conscious matter and non-conscious matter. The simplest explanation (as in requires the fewest entities in our ontology) is that there is just one kind of matter and that physical processes that we already allow into our ontology for external reasons are sufficient to explain why some matter is conscious.

If you mean conscious as in "acts like a human" then sure. If you mean conscious as in "has an internal experience" then that doesn't follow at all.

It is an open question what exactly internal experience is. It is begging the question to say its obvious that physical processes cannot have internal experience. But if we have no information regarding whether physical processes can have internal experience, then it is reasonable to prefer physicalism on grounds of parsimony.

I'd say an important part of consciousness is learning. Without learning we would not even be able to make sense of what is in front of our eyes. A particle doesn't learn, so it can't be conscious.

What is learning?

A particle responds to its environment. A system of particles reconfigures itself in response to the environment, sometimes in a persistent way. That's all your brain is doing when it "learns"

Yes, while being threatened with extinction if they do it wrong. That's the key ingredient - self replication and natural selection. Keeps the learning honest to reality.