Re:German Brute Forces SHA1 in 49 Minutes for $2
by pilif on Friday November 19, 2010 @12:15PM
(#1921946)
the "attack" was using a dictionary. Salting would certainly defeat that, so he'd have to brute-force the key-space which would take years despite the parallel GPU power.
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Re:German Brute Forces SHA1 in 49 Minutes for $2
by tptacek on Friday November 19, 2010 @12:23PM
(#1921972)
Exactly how do you think a salt defeats a dictionary attack?
Re:German Brute Forces SHA1 in 49 Minutes for $2
by cperciva on Friday November 19, 2010 @12:35PM
(#1922012)
the "attack" was using a dictionary. Salting would certainly defeat that
No.
Re:German Brute Forces SHA1 in 49 Minutes for $2
by blibble on Friday November 19, 2010 @12:38PM
(#1922026)
(in response to tptacek below)
it doesn't help against a single hash, but for multiple hashes you scale up the amount of work required by the number of salts in use.
Re:German Brute Forces SHA1 in 49 Minutes for $2
by tptacek on Friday November 19, 2010 @12:48PM
(#1922066)
If the observation made here was "this guy got unrealistically impressive results because he was able to parallelize across every password hash", I'd agree.
But the observation was instead "this attack worked largely because the passwords weren't salted". No, false. This attack set a price of $1.62 per password using the simplest available GPU cluster resource. In no definition of cryptographic security is $1.62 a reasonable threshold.
Scrypt, bcrypt, or PBKDF2 can increase that cost factor to many tens of thousands of dollars per password without incurring appreciable costs to the applications using it.