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Re:Ledger's Advanced Side Channel Analysis Repository by teej on Tuesday February 19, 2019 @01:44PM (#19201562)
My understanding of timing attacks is that they can be used when you can trigger the code path thousands of times quickly. This gives you execution time averages and distributions. Also, they're typically used against cryptographic hash functions which are more expensive than just a string compare.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timing_attack

Re:Ledger's Advanced Side Channel Analysis Repository by jolmg on Tuesday February 19, 2019 @01:52PM (#19201637)
But if you use cryptographic hash functions, then you can't do the timing attack described because any one character change changes the whole hash.
Re:Ledger's Advanced Side Channel Analysis Repository by Nursie on Tuesday February 19, 2019 @02:02PM (#19201739)
Not for cracking a password perhaps, but imagine you have a system that looks at a MAC'd ciphertext. You want the system to attempt to decrypt a malicious ciphertext you've generated, but it won't until you have passed its MAC check.

With a timing attack, you can iterate the bytes of the MAC, itself probably based on a cryptographic hash like HMAC(sha256), until you get something that gets to the second stage.

You reduce MAC-forging complexity from 2 to the power of the number of MAC bits, to 256 times the number of bytes in the MAC.

Re:Ledger's Advanced Side Channel Analysis Repository by saagarjha on Tuesday February 19, 2019 @02:08PM (#19201792)
Yup, that's why this attack doesn't really work on hash functions.