The situation he's pointing out is that you shouldn't have to be going to homeless shelters or camping in a natural park. The fact these are named as options is even rather farcical, reminding me of the quote that the rich and poor are equally barred from stealing loaves of bread and camping outside buildings. It goes beyond preference into a totally different qualitative state of living.
And actually, he is exactly talking about 'camping in a natural park':
> Let us complete the argument of M. Ch. Comte. A man who should be prohibited from walking in the highways, from resting in the fields, from taking shelter in caves, from lighting fires, from picking berries, from gathering herbs and boiling them in a bit of baked clay, — such a man could not live.
If 'a man' is free to do what he describes above, the ultimate basic human life, then he is free. You're adding onto that, somehow claiming Proudhon is also advocating for a free life with creature comforts. Proudhon is describing the basic freedom that someone without money and without assets should be able to exercise in the world - they can move about, they can sleep in a field, gather naturally growing wild food, and cook over a fire. He is absolutely not talking about some 'minimum level of comfort' that the rest of the world owes them.
Proudhon's theory of mutualism entails only usufructary use of property, that is to say, only property in possession rather than a title to land in perpetuity to do what you want with it. The theory doesn't see it as a good way to run society to profit from loans and rent.
If you had any more doubt about Proudhon's direction:
>But property, in its derivative sense, and by the definitions of law, is a right outside of society; for it is clear that, if the wealth of each was social wealth, the conditions would be equal for all, and it would be a contradiction to say: Property is a man’s right to dispose at will of social property. Then if we are associated for the sake of liberty, equality, and security, we are not associated for the sake of property; then if property is a natural right, this natural right is not social, but anti-social. Property and society are utterly irreconcilable institutions. It is as impossible to associate two proprietors as to join two magnets by their opposite poles. Either society must perish, or it must destroy property.
"prohibit[ion] from walking in the highways, from resting in the fields, from taking shelter in caves, from lighting fires, from picking berries, from gathering herbs and boiling them in a bit of baked clay" is a much broader principle and restriction than what is at stake here. I don't mind discussing it, but I think we should be clear. To conflate the government-protected right of a landlord to evict trespassers from privately owned property, with the government prohibiting anyone from walking down a road (modern translation of 'highway') or camping in (e.g.) a national forest, is disingenuous.
Even if I were to grant the above point, the second does not follow. Appropriation is here a question of wholesale restriction; Proudhon says that because a naturally provided necessity is scarce, it must be made absolutely free of restriction. (aside: even if that were just, it would be impossible to maintain, in the case of land, due to bad actors.) Yet we are not dealing with a dichotomy here, as Proudhon implies: what we currently experience, at least in the US, is accommodation made by the government for both ends of the economic spectrum. If you are sufficiently rich, you can afford private housing. If you are not, you have government-sponsored public housing. If you are not eligible, there are homeless shelters. If there isn't room there, the national parks are available for camping.
I don't argue that the latter options are preferable, but they answer the objection raised by your source. In short, because the problem raised by P. is not present, the argument justified by that problem is not valid.