Yes, but participating in an auction is a concrete action to "commit to pay" -- and therefore not what the author is talking about.
The context of the author's quote you extracted ("asking people what they'd pay"†) is about abstract notions of what consumers think they would pay; e.g. gathering hypotheticals of prices from marketing efforts like customer surveys or focus groups.
Surveys and focus groups have no real money payment commitments. Auctions do.
† author also wrote a few sentences later: "When it comes to money, people are unable to predict accurately whether they’d pay or not. It’s much easier to spend hypothetical dollars than real ones."
For this to work, wouldn't the participants need to believe that the auction really is the only way they can get a subscription?
So, how should you bid if you are a rational person? You should bid the maximum you are willing to pay. As there is zero chance that you will pay more than you needed: you will always pay just enough to beat the second place bidder.
So, the incentive is such that you reveal your maximum price to eBay.
I don't understand how it removes the incentive? Would you mind going into more detail?
(I ask because I believe I am rational when I place eBay bids, and I always choose the actual maximum I'm willing to pay.)
The reason is that for most goods (luxury goods, stuff with resale value, stuff where you might now all the details, etc.) you are actually dealing with a common value auction, so you DON'T want to reveal your cards before hand.
For instance, suppose I see an auction with 5 existing bids.. I stop and say wait that's probably something interesting, and start doing a bit more research on the value of the coin.
Similarly, I might do some quick research and decide that a coin is valued at $10, but if I see bids at $100 that means that either my prior was wrong or the bidders are wrong, and thus I do a bit more research and try to see if there is anything special about the coin (e.g. the quality is actually higher than what the auction description says).
Then besides all these rational motives, you have the irrational ones. A lot of people bid on things almost like gambling (bid the maximum+1, if that doesn't make them the highest bidders, then keep bidding). If you don't place your bid out there, you prevent this problem altogether. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_value_auction
another (classic) alternative is conjoint analysis: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conjoint_analysis_(marketing)
it's difficult to do well, but will reveal willingness-to-pay without requiring the commitment of real dollars.
Sounds like a catch-22 situation, how did these studies determine they actually measured a person's maximum willinges-to-pay? Even when a person has decided what their maximum is, there are many known sales tactics that can increase it beyond what the buyer initially decided. Some, like bait-and-switch are so effective that they're outlawed. So, it'd be really interesting to hear how these studies actually determined they actually measured what they said they did.
Yes, asking a person about what he or she is willing to pay _hypothetically_ doesn't work. But there are numerous scientific studies that show that using a Vickrey auction, similar to Google's ad auction mechanism, can elicit a person's maximum willingness-to-pay. In fact, it's one of the reasons why William Vickrey won the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. The primary reason why you would reveal your maximum willingness-to-pay in a Vickrey auction is because you know beforehand that if you win the auction, you won't have to pay your own bid——you always pay less than your own bid as a winner. How much less is up to the auctioneer but in all cases it's less than your own bid. The pay-what-you-want mechanism cannot reveal how much a person values a product or service because there's such a strong financial incentive to simply state a low amount.
Disclaimer: I'm the co-founder of Veylinx, a platform to measure maximum willingness-to-pay of users using Vickrey auctions.