Re:CVE-2019-5736: runc container breakout
by wodny on Tuesday February 12, 2019 @07:18AM
(#19142885)
The vulnerability description seems to be lacking an explanation why the /proc/$PID/exe symlink is so special and why using the #!/proc/self/exe hashbang will work while using #!/usr/sbin/runc probably won't. Am I right that the proc filesystem in proc_exe_link() fills the file_operations struct in a way that causes open() not to go through a dereferencing procedure using the filesystem but just open the file used to run the executable?
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Re:CVE-2019-5736: runc container breakout
by wodny on Tuesday February 12, 2019 @06:14PM
(#19148688)
So I will answer myself. Experiments suggest it is like that: https://www.reddit.com/r/linux/comments/apmptq/cve20195736_r...