Re:CVE-2019-5736: runc container breakout
by tyingq on Monday February 11, 2019 @12:38PM
(#19136285)
Is this something that non-privileged containers mitigates? Curious what the big barriers are to this. I know they exist, but aren't used widely...I assume because some functionality doesn't work.
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Re:CVE-2019-5736: runc container breakout
by iwalton3 on Monday February 11, 2019 @12:48PM
(#19136381)
Yes. The lxc commit[1] states that this issue only affects privileged containers. No CVE has been issued for lxc because they consider privileged containers to be insecure.
In my experience unprivileged containers work for most tasks, but there is breakage in some areas. Usually the issues are simple to resolve, like disabling OOM adjustments in systemd or changing the idmap range in winbind to be within the namespace allotment.
[1] https://github.com/lxc/lxc/commit/6400238d08cdf1ca20d49bafb8...
Re:CVE-2019-5736: runc container breakout
by brauner on Monday February 11, 2019 @02:21PM
(#19137410)
I've also written a smallish blogpost about this CVE. I'm a LX{C,D} maintainer and I've worked with Aleksa the runC maintainer together on a fix for this CVE:
https://brauner.github.io/2019/02/12/privileged-containers.h...
Thank you @brauner for writing this blogpost!
IIUC, using Docker's userns-remap would protect against this CVE by making the containers run unprivileged (container's id 0 != host's id 0) and should generally be the industry's best practice.
Re:CVE-2019-5736: runc container breakout
by cpuguy83 on Monday February 11, 2019 @04:40PM
(#19138610)
In terms of mitigation, simply running as non-root is not enough as it is very difficult to prevent escalation to root (e.g. suid binaries).
User namespaces which is setup such that uid's in the container are not mapped to any in-use uids on the host is needed.