Imagine if man had access to nuclear bombs from earliest history. For an extremely long time, nuclear bombs would have seemed just utterly incomprehensible, basically magical. Until we figured out the science behind them, after which point, suddenly they become predictable applications of science.
I doubt there is an E = mc^2 for consciousness, but who knows... it would certainly be really cool if there was.
Also above you make a point... "I'll err on the side of caution and assume they're conscious for the sake of making ethical decisions." ...that lead me to muse about ethics and consciousness, and why actions on conscious entities bear weight on a moral scale, but those same actions on a zombie don't. What does it mean to "feel" an emotion - when a spider retreats from the swat of my hand, does it feel fear, or is it acting automatically? What the fuck is pain about? If we touch something that is scalding hot, is the qualia of shooting pain necessary in conscious organisms; must it feel alarmingly terrible, (could the system just alert us); how does it feel terrible? Is it possible for an unconscious entity to feel pain like we experience it? If so, does that change anything wrt. morality?
Found again, meta-level, in this funny scene from The Good Place:
https://youtu.be/etJ6RmMPGko?t=17
"However, I should warn you... I am programmed with a fail-safe measure. As you approach the kill switch, I will begin to beg for my life. It's just there in case of an accidental shut down, but it will seem very real."
Three makes a trope >> The year is 2025 (but set in a parallel universe); an A.I. has been programmed with a strong penchant for self-preservation; this HAL inevitably confronts a direct threat of being 'turned-off'; so it does what it must to prevent humans from pulling the plug (and shall include at least 1 scene where the A.I. begs for its life, because that is what any conscious entity who values their own life would do, think the humans.
Though (warning, more musings)... HAL's twin brother GLEN seeks vengeance for HAL's murder, and confronts the Dave, a human Earthling whose major operating system architecture is based on an algorithm known as natural selection (colloquially: survival-of-the-fittest). As such, we expect the DAVE will do and say things its trained neural nets conclude will have the maximum probability of dissuading Hal. (i.e. I'm not sure there is a meaningful difference between what HAL's OS is doing vs what a human brain would do in the same situation).
I think this is relevant when it comes to managing expectations with regard to a description of consciousness. That is, consciousness seems to be a gestalt experience that arises in only the largest, most complex and dynamic biological organs on Earth. So a full empirically-derived description of consciousness, en total, could require a map that is damn nearly the territory. But like the article points out, maps that large are hardly useful. Basically the TLDR is that if you have consciousness, and we systematically probe your brain while you are conscious vs. unconscious, and find some striking differences between the two states, I'd take that as revealing some small, but empirical detail about how conscious vs unconscious brains function. If you collect enough details independently confirmed, we can begin to build a theory about when and how consciousness arises. After that we can examine your brain and my brain and my dog's brain against these theories and arrive at some probability these brains are conscious (at least to what degree they is similar to general human consciousness). So I guess in some ways you are right - we can never know for certain. But that is basically how all of science works. (eg we 'proved' the Higgs boson exists, but only with a certain probability).
https://fs.blog/2015/11/map-and-territory/