Re:How to prevent cryptographic pitfalls by design [video]
by tptacek on Thursday February 07, 2019 @03:31PM
(#19108288)
I took the original argument to be "if you use secret_box, you don't even know that you're using Salsa20, so if a cryptanalysis of Salsa20 is published, you might not realize and know to fix that problem".
Which is, I think, a silly argument; if someone finds a stack overflow in a Markdown library, I still need the maintainers of that library to tell me about it --- nobody is going to tell me about it directly. I have more information to act on in the secret_box scenario, not less.
But I was a little confused by the argument too, so maybe I'm not making that much sense either.
Given that I don't really understand the parent commenter's point. You touched on this a little with your example of a Markdown library - as software engineers we use things which are substantially black boxes all the time. It seems strange to me that you'd want to do surgery on the raw primitives of a library instead of updating it to suit your needs. In this case, that means just use a reputable crypto library and update it when there's a reported security vulnerability.
You don't even need to buy into, "Don't roll your own crypto" to lean into this.