Even in that wikipedia article you linked:
> These early attempts of simulation have been criticized for not being biologically realistic. Although we have the complete structural connectome, we do not know the synaptic weights at each of the known synapses. We do not even know whether the synapses are inhibitory or excitatory. To compensate for this the Hiroshima group used machine learning to find some weights of the synapses which would generate the desired behaviour. It is therefore no surprise that the model displayed the behaviour, and it may not represent true understanding of the system.
The common thread running through many of these comments is people who don't appreciate just how complex biology is, and how much we don't understand, are nevertheless confidently asserting that some Turning machine they can half-imagine will obviously be able to "think" the way a brain does.
The Chinese Room argument essentially tries to make a point that it's impossible at any level of complexity. The only way that can be true is if you reject materialism entirely, and adopt the notion that there's something else that "bestows" intelligence on a brain, that cannot be replicated by any artificial physical means (but is somehow still replicated in utero). It's not really a verifiable claim, which is evident from the very design of the experiment - it says that there are things that appear intelligent to any possible test, but still aren't, because common sense, essentially.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenWorm
If we do that, wouldn't said simulation be an algorithm that ends up on your spectrum?
But also, I'm curious why your spectrum is defined the way it is - i.e. why a clam can have sentience, but not a laptop? Because one is organic, and the other one is not? But doesn't that imply that your definition of sentience inherently excludes anything artificial?