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Re:A proposed API for full-memory encryption by amluto on Thursday January 31, 2019 @10:11AM (#19045215)
Intel has an IOMMU for PCIe. And DMA sees cleartext with (MK)TME.
Re:A proposed API for full-memory encryption by Flow on Thursday January 31, 2019 @11:48AM (#19046155)
There are hardware based cheats for CSGO. It’s a PCI card with some custom CPU/FPGA on it that scans and changes values inside the memory of the game.

When I read the title I hoped it would protect against that too, but no such luck then, I guess?

Re:A proposed API for full-memory encryption by blattimwind on Thursday January 31, 2019 @12:08PM (#19046373)
TBH if you have to resort to bus-based cheating in a game then I'd say it counts as a win for the anti-cheat software.
Re:A proposed API for full-memory encryption by Flow on Friday February 01, 2019 @09:56AM (#19054530)
There are plenty of cheats that are seemingly impossible to detect. I play Team Fortress 2 and there's at least one cheat there that, from what I've read, uses code that's unique to each instance used by a cheater. VAC seems to scan for code signatures so it doesn't detect it.

This hardware cheat makes it even harder to detect since it reads and writes directly to main memory using DMA. No drivers or software needed at all. All you possibly could detect is the PCI-ID(which can be changed) and possibly the DMA if there's an IOMMU.

https://blog.esea.net/esea-hardware-cheats/

Re:A proposed API for full-memory encryption by posix_me_less on Thursday January 31, 2019 @02:15PM (#19047769)
> And DMA sees cleartext with (MK)TME.

Could you please translate this into non-expert language? Does it mean DMA granted devices can break IOMMU separation?

Re:A proposed API for full-memory encryption by amluto on Thursday January 31, 2019 @02:31PM (#19047919)
No, I mean that, if the IOMMU is off or if it allows access to an address, then MKTME will treat that access exactly as though it was a normal access from the CPU. So, if the device selects the right key (the key uses some otherwise unused physical address bits), then the device will access the decrypted data.