'Karma': A hack used by the UAE to break into iPhones of foes

Re:'Karma': A hack used by the UAE to break into iPhones of ... by sobellian on Wednesday January 30, 2019 @02:42PM (#19038578)

The objections to a golden key are irrespective of whatever system permits the golden key access. Your hashchains are completely irrelevant. The courts will use some key to sign their request, and that key will leak.

Cryptography reduces message security to key security, nothing more.

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Re:'Karma': A hack used by the UAE to break into iPhones of ... by FakeComments on Wednesday January 30, 2019 @05:28PM (#19040278)

That’s why it’s a two stage system: leaking the key only permits forged requests, but an attacker still has to spend the time reversing the hash chain. For each and every phone they want to crack.

Apple has also done a reasonable job of holding onto their signing keys, to date.

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Re:'Karma': A hack used by the UAE to break into iPhones of ... by jhayward on Wednesday January 30, 2019 @05:48PM (#19040439)

> Apple has also done a reasonable job of holding onto their signing keys, to date.

How do you know that?

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Re:'Karma': A hack used by the UAE to break into iPhones of ... by FakeComments on Wednesday January 30, 2019 @05:54PM (#19040481)

Because whoever has stolen them has been reasonably discreet, and we don’t see compromised Apple things all over the place — which means if they’ve been stolen at all, it’s been by high class attackers.

If your goal is to stop the NSA et al stealing a key or owning a device, you’ll be sad.

But if your goal is to change the law and redefine the parameters of them owning devices, you might make progress. The political process will insist on a means to access these devices, and they’ll accomplish it by one means or another. By engaging with instead of fighting that, we gain the ability to have a say on what those means are.

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