For those who make the effort, configuration management and monitoring systems that continuously profile one's own network are another way to deal with a growing, unfirewalled cluster. And they avoid having to learn yet another vendor's CLI or slow down iterations in resistance to changes on the one-off system.
As someone who sells exactly such a system, let me advise everyone not to use them as a replacement for a single, central, simple, coherent firewall.
In any case, folks should be continuously profiling their networks integrated into monitoring/alerts. I find many firewalls that are doing different things than my clients expect they are -- or have just been left to diverge from reality in some form of config rot. Automated testing surfaces these differences.
Can you really put "simple" in the same sentence as firewall? Vendors prevent that. Folks don't have time to maintain them.
Re:Why should I firewall servers?
by sliverstorm on Saturday November 13, 2010 @10:42PM
(#1902441)
The way I think of it is a firewall shouldn't be needed, but the cost of adding and running one is pretty small. Besides, saying "just don't make mistakes and you won't need one" is useless- everyone makes mistakes, and that's why we use firewalls.
Exactly. By using iptables on his host, as he describes, he is in effect firewalling it. But if you have 25 hosts you probably would want a firewall in front of them.
Re:Why should I firewall servers?
by silvestrov on Sunday November 14, 2010 @08:53AM
(#1903210)
And if you have 250 hosts, you want to use a firewall between groups of them so the network is compartmentalized: so if one host is hacked it will not be able to take down all the other hosts.
When a server is compromized then iptables on it won't help anymore, not even to detect that the server is compromized! Only a firewall running on a seperate piece of hardware helps.
A system should never be designed with the assumption that it will never be hacked: that is like planning for a life where you never get sick.
But, once you have two machines, it makes far better sense to centralize access control in a single place. With two machines, it's simply good engineering. As your stable of machines grows, it's less a style point and more a necessity. It's hard to keep a group of machines in sync with a single policy, and virtually impossible to avoid mistakes and windows of vulnerability over the long run.
An attacker that truly wants to target your network can continuously profile your network, and is more likely to spot your mistakes than you are. A sensible way to approach network security is to assume that there's always someone who's willing put forth the effort to break in.