Another way is to bootstrap up to a C compiler from machine-language upwards. So that every "level upgrade" in the bootstrap chain can be verified independently.
Here is one bootstrapping effort:
The spec of a compiler is also relatively simple, so there isn't a lot of room for backdoors there.
But aside from these incidental properties, yes the same thing could be done.
(This still leaves a large class of related, less recursively symmetric integrity attacks that could be made without the language fully bootstrapping itself, of course)
https://staff.aist.go.jp/tanaka-akira/succinct/slide-pro114....
They extract from Coq to C. Like in my Brute-Force Assurance concept, that would let us confirm and supplement the formal verification by hitting the C output with every V&V tool for C programs that we have on hand.
How do you know it hasn't already been compromised =)
Here's a link that worked for me: http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~dga/15-712/F14/papers/p761-thompson.p...
>We compile the modified source with the normal C compiler to produce a bugged binary. We install this binary as the official C compiler. We can now remove the bugs from the source of the compiler and the new binary will reinsert the bugs whenever it is compiled. Of course, the login command will remain bugged with no trace in source anywhere.)