Hypothesis A: college coursework actually increases a student's future work productivity.
Hypothesis B: the least productive laborers are unable to be admitted to a college, or unable to graduate. The admissions and graduation filters thus raise the productivity average in the pool of graduates.
Hypothesis C: businesses with the most productive workers tend to prefer college graduates. Workers without degrees appear to be less productive because the only jobs available to them have inherently lower productivity.
Hypothesis D: productivity is measured differently for some workers, based in part on whether they have college degrees.
Hypothesis E: some workers are able to influence the measurement of productivity, such that productivity originating from other workers is reassigned to them, and those cheating workers tend to have degrees.
Hypothesis F: workers with degrees tend to have debts, and are forced by necessity to be more productive in order to first pay them off, and then later save enough for retirement with a shorter savings window.
Hypothesis G: workers with degrees are more productive because the past correlation generates an expectation that they be more productive.
The observation could have complex cause, and all of the above may be true.
Claiming that high education has only signaling value is ridiculous. (It's even more ridiculous than claiming it has no signaling value.)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signalling_(economics)