Searle claims that the argument demonstrates this, but his response to the 'systems reply' shows that he does not appear to understand the challenge that it presents to the argument:

"My response to the systems theory is quite simple: let the individual internalize all of these elements of the system. He memorizes the rules in the ledger and the data banks of Chinese symbols, and he does all the calculations in his head. The individual then incorporates the entire system. There isn't anything at all to the system that he does not encompass. We can even get rid of the room and suppose he works outdoors. All the same, he understands nothing of the Chinese, and a fortiori neither does the system, because there isn't anything in the system that isn't in him. If he doesn't understand, then there is no way the system could understand because the system is just a part of him."

Searle does not seem to understand that the systems reply is not dependent on where or how the components of the system are implemented. He apparently cannot conceive that, while the subject's conscious mind is solely occupied with mechanically performing the operations of the algorithm, the system that her conscious mind is part of actually understands something, and that this would be so even if the system were implemented entirely within the physical body of the subject. It is an outlandish concept, but the premise of the experiment is itself outlandish, and a philosopher should not expect ordinary intuitions to be a reliable guide to what would happen in such cases.

There are two types of expanded responses to the Systems Theory: the first is a line of argument extending into modal logic and the second is a line of argument that blurs the lines between the Chinese Room Argument and other arguments that purport to show computation as insufficient for 'mind'. Of course - as often happens over decades of discourse in analytical philosophy - the boundary between even these two lines of argument that I just classified is rather fuzzy (shoutout to Zadeh).

The SEP entry mentions Schaeffer (2009) and Nute (2011) for the line of disagreement extending into a discussion of modality.

Regarding the second line of argument, the entry mentions Harnad (2012) and says that he appears to follow Searle in, "linking understanding and states of consciousness" as well as arguing "that the core problem of conscious "feeling" requires sensory connections to the real world."

The primary issue in all of this is whether certain non-biological systems (i.e. a computer) are sufficient for the understanding generated by certain biological systems (i.e. humans). This has not much of anything to do with physicalism or dualism, no matter what certain responses by non-experts (Penrose, Kurzweil, etc.) would have some believe. The fact that Cole even mentions Kurzweil is, arguably, a disservice to those outside the relevant domain.

The take-away is this: in analytical philosophy, many famous thought experiments are important not for their intended conclusions, but for the expanded dialectic they generate, and which lasts for decades (if not longer). The expanded dialectic brings additional clarity and raises important questions that had either gone unnoticed or were impossible to see before the thought experiment.

Decades of arguments attempting to short-circuit the scientific process, by claiming to show that minds cannot possibly work this way or that way, do not seem to have contributed much, if anything, to our understanding of how they do work. It all seems very self-referential, in that there is a lot of arguing about arguments.

I think the suggestion that lengthy arguments in the philosophy of mind are attempting to short-circuit scientific progress is a bit uncharitable.

There is a small minority of individuals on both sides that seem to want to slow scientific progress (whether intentionally or not). Now, the vast majority of the time it is presumed people like Searle fit this description. People like Dennett fit this description as well, though. Anyone truly making definitive claims about having resolved the question of (say) conciousness, is not taking the right tack from a scientific perspective.

I did not intend to suggest that there is anything wrong with attempting to cut the Gordian knot with an insightful analysis, it is just that, in these cases, it does not seem to have led to anything useful. And Dennett's book 'Consciousness Explained' is certainly presumptuously titled, though he is at least looking for explanations, when he is not confronting those who claim it can't be done. Meanwhile, the state of technology has advanced to the point where we can at least imagine Searle, in his room, competing successfully in a Chinese-language game of Jeopardy.

No-one ever disproved vitalism, but its implicit threat to the progress of biology simply dropped by the wayside.