And how is any of this, any of it all, relevant in a world where registrars can simply speak RDAP to CAs? If you believe the problem is that the Internet will (to use your turn of phrase upthread) crumble away unless we secure the DNS for domain validation, why should we forklift out the entire DNS to do so, when we can just get a small group of organizations to deploy RDAP, something they're planning on deploying anyways, and then add that to the 10 Blessed Methods?
No part of DNSSEC makes any sense.
It makes no sense not to try to secure the DNS.
Deploying RDAP and adding it to the CA/B Forum Blessed Methods gives CA's themselves an end-to-end ability to validate domains, decisively solving the DV problem, and doesn't require any of that expense.
Explain to me again why we should choose the former over the latter?
So you’re already trusting the DNS, whether protected with DNSSEC or not, in the existing system.