That's true of the original (Sprout) SNARK, but the newer (Sapling) SNARK used a much more scalable MPC ceremony, which they called Powers of Tau: https://z.cash.foundation/blog/powers-of-tau/
There was a public call for participation at the time, so if you wanted to be sure that the ceremony was not corrupted, you could just participate yourself.
For backwards compatibility, the Sprout SNARK can still be used, so if the original ceremony was compromised, an attacker could still create coins "out of thin air". But converting a Sprout account to a Sapling account requires making the amount public, so if the number of coins converted exceeded the intended currency supply, that would be detected. Worst case scenario, a hard fork could be arranged to disable the Sprout SNARK.
Your reply here is highly misleading, even lying by omission.
The prominent Bitcoin developer, Peter Todd was invited to participate, too. You can read his entertaining blogpost about the setup procedure at here.
https://web.archive.org/web/20161114214233/https://petertodd...
The funny and alarming story is, after he finished the setup, he became increasingly suspicious about the security of the procedures, especially casted doubts on some technical problems that prevented reproducible build (!!!) of the setup programs. And he later had withdrawn his blogpost and all the claims of security altogether. To me, it's alarming, in the end, we'll never get solid security guarantees.