Cargo makes it very easy to add dependencies. Rust has the same culture of small, single-purpose libraries as npm (there is https://crates.io/crates/left_pad if you're wondering).

This of course raises the question: what if someone puts some malware in a crate? Cargo itself has an OK security (and working on more end-to-end integrity checks), so it's unlikely that someone will inject malware into existing crates, but that still leaves question of trusting the original crate authors.

Rust is not a sandbox language. Even the "safe" subset of the language is still just about preventing bugs, but nowhere near a watertight sandbox required to protect programmers and users from straight-up malware running in their own program. It's not clear if that is even possible in an efficient, low-level systems programming language.

So the most reasonable way forward is to ensure that all code you use is either from people you trust, or has been verified by you or someone you trust.

Turning code reviews into a shareable artifact is a pretty cool addition here, as it reduces duplication of work across the community (you don't have to review everything personally), and helps you pick and choose who you trust.

Not only that, but even just the act of building a dependency is unsafe as dependencies can specify build scripts (which is just Rust code that's compiled and executed prior to building the crate).

https://crates.io/crates/kik

"waiting for a takedown notice :P"

This of course raises the question: what if someone puts some malware in a crate?

Do decentralized web of trust schemes actually work? What are the precedents? AFAIK, only centralized webs of trust work, and even those still leak around the edges and take some degree of active policing to defend. Basically, someone (or maybe a few competing someones) with authority establishes a canonical boundary and publishes a canonical list.

How can you claim that? Looking at most tech we have today, it becomes readily apparent that most technology needs multiple iterations before achieving wide adoption. Web of trust is no exception.

The lack of a widely-adopted precedent implying that some tech is forever poor is a sloppy conclusion to make.

Yes, but decentralized webs of trust have been tried before, and the "flat" ones with no centralization fade away or become hipster tchotkes. I think it's a valuable question to ask. Have we done the analyses for why the previous ones didn't work?

I like this. It would be nice to flag questionable areas outside of the maintainer's control, for other experts to look at. Sometime's I've seen something fishy that I share with a friend/colleague who might know how to interpret it, but often times it's in a language/framework that I might not have a friend to ask.

The open source saying "given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow" has always been a faux pas, because there has never been enough eyeballs, especially on small projects. However, something like this could begin to close the gap. +1 from me

And the real problem aren't even people trying to steal your bitcoins [1], you notice that and hopefully had not all your eggs in one basket, it's a (sometimes expensive) lesson in IT security. The much more serious threat are state level actors trying to backdoor secure communication channels, the breach will happen without your knowledge. One shouldn't expect that every nation will take the obvious and public route like the Australian government [2], simply demanding access. With enough resources it seems totally viable to backdoor just one deep dependency of some UI framework and circumvent all end to end encryption used by affected apps.

I hope distributed code review will get some traction not only in the Rust world, but in the whole open source universe.

[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18534392

[2] https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/12/signal-to-austra...

It also has some nicer narrative examples.

I like this:

> Design is open for supporting PGP, Salty, Keybase, and whatever else in the future.

> Note: Systems like that don't carry enough information. Just because you verified that someones PGP really belong to them, doesn't mean you trust their code review judgment. But the identity/singing system could be reused.

This is so important. We souldn't trust packages but the people that assume responsibility for them.

We need to trust the code not the programmer

Crev seems interesting because it not only has the web-of-trust mechanic going on, but also because it creates an incentive to actually do code reviews on existing code. There's now a whole open frontier of "code that hasn't been reviewed in crev", which people might feel compelled to jump on. "Hey, my favorite crate isn't reviewed, I'll can do it". etc.

> It protects against compromised dev accounts, intentional malicious code, typesquating, compromised package registries, or just plain poor quality.

A review is only valid for a specific version/hash of a set of files, so if you only upgrade your dependencies once they have enough trusted reviews you should be safe.

I've been saying for years that webs-of-trust are the solution for so many problems, including this one.

[1] https://github.com/onur/cargo-license