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Re:This is why sites choose to stay vulnerable to Firesheep by kneath on Sunday November 07, 2010 @06:32PM (#1880719)
Okay, here's another "just as easy" scenario:

1. You include http://google.com/trusted.js on a https page

2. Someone goes to a cafe, opens up your website with Safari while someone is performing a MiTM attack on that file.

3. No warnings, your user is compromised.

Re:This is why sites choose to stay vulnerable to Firesheep by tlrobinson on Monday November 08, 2010 @12:21AM (#1881492)
Yeah, then don't do that, that's the point. Whether you include mixed content in your site is up to you, the developer.
Re:This is why sites choose to stay vulnerable to Firesheep by kneath on Monday November 08, 2010 @02:33AM (#1881746)
The entire concept of the SSL icon is so that a user can trust a third party (web developer) that they don't know. If it's up to you (the web developer) — it's all up in the air again. And the icon/warnings are pointless. Which is where I've been trying to go with this…
Re:This is why sites choose to stay vulnerable to Firesheep by JoachimSchipper on Monday November 08, 2010 @04:28AM (#1881921)
Eh? SSL provides security against eavesdroppers, network manipulation, etc. - it doesn't help against a malicious site that you actually intended to communicate with.
Re:This is why sites choose to stay vulnerable to Firesheep by zmmmmm on Sunday November 07, 2010 @06:36PM (#1880728)
Any browser which doesn't warn about that in some way is essentially broken. (Yes, I see you cited Safari as one, but it must the the only one as far as I know - it does remove the padlock, but that seems pretty inadequate ...)

EDIT: I do take your point in that I think IE is the only browser that actually blocks the content. The others warn about it but still load it, by which time, of course, the damage is done.

Re:This is why sites choose to stay vulnerable to Firesheep by othermaciej on Monday November 08, 2010 @05:27AM (#1882019)
Our theory is that an SSL site including non-SSL content is no better or worse, in terms of security, than a completely non-SSL site.

What is the purpose of warning more prominently in the scenario described, than in the scenario where the user goes to a non-SSL site in the first page, or is redirected from an SSL login form to a non-SSL page?