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Re:This is why sites choose to stay vulnerable to Firesheep by kijinbear on Sunday November 07, 2010 @05:55PM (#1880605)
While your frustration is understandable, I think you're speaking from the perspective of a tech-savvy person and not the average user. If browsers began accepting all free / self-signed certificates, it would be only a matter of time before something like "Firesheep FX" came along and permitted random strangers to MITM anybody's SSL session. Some of us can notice when that happens, but most people won't have a clue unless the browser presented them with a big scary red warning.

However, I agree with you that we need some good free CAs. The difference between free and $10/year is bigger than most of us think it is. Fortunately, there are registrars such as Gandi which will give you free certificates with every domain.

Re:This is why sites choose to stay vulnerable to Firesheep by Udo on Sunday November 07, 2010 @06:06PM (#1880635)
> If browsers began accepting all free / self-signed certificates [...]

Right now, browsers are accepting any unencrypted old HTTP connection without any warning, while non-verified securely encrypted connections are actively prevented. Tech people can circumvent the block, but normal users cannot. Nor do they have any reason to because the warning they are being shown sounds like the end of the world, while any unsecured connection looks perfectly fine to them. This is something that could be done right now to make everybody more secure, at no cost, but it threatens the business model of companies like Verisign.

Nobody is suggesting that browser makers should display the much-sought-after "lock of absolute protection" icon on any random SSL connection, I'd be fine if they reserve that for paid-for-certs. I'm merely suggesting they show free (or even self-signed) certs the same courtesy as basic HTTP, the most permissive protocol of all time, instead of actively preventing users from using encryption.

I agree with you about the threat of "Firesheep FX" and believe Wifi connections should probably all use WPA2, even at coffee shops where internet access is free. The threat of MITM is real, but the attack can be made more difficult using a number of schemes, and it even includes free certs that offer way more protection than any unencrypted link ever could. Yet, we are currently encouraging unencrypted connections while actively blocking encrypted ones.

If HTTPS could have the same UI mechanisms as, say, an SSH connection I'm convinced the online world would be a much safer place.

Re:This is why sites choose to stay vulnerable to Firesheep by kijinbear on Sunday November 07, 2010 @06:33PM (#1880721)
OK, I see what you mean. If you're suggesting that websites protected with untrusted certificates should be treated as if they were plain HTTP sites, then I agree with you. Chrome crosses out the "https" part of the URL if the page contains insecure elements. Something similar might be the right way to treat untrusted certificates.
Re:This is why sites choose to stay vulnerable to Firesheep by nikcub on Sunday November 07, 2010 @06:31PM (#1880713)
Wifi connections should probably all use WPA2, even at coffee shops

if you just write the password on the wall, it defeats the purpose - everyone who logs in is on the same network again, just like a public network

Re:This is why sites choose to stay vulnerable to Firesheep by eru on Sunday November 07, 2010 @06:43PM (#1880748)
Everyone being on the same network isn't too much of a problem. They still can't read each others traffic. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IEEE_802.11i-2004 or http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wi-Fi_Protected_Access#WPA2

Every device negotiates its own keys with the access point.

Re:This is why sites choose to stay vulnerable to Firesheep by hannibalhorn on Sunday November 07, 2010 @07:24PM (#1880859)
Very common misconception, but it's still a problem. Any client with the network password can capture the initial key negotiation, and then decrypt the client's subsequent traffic. You can enter the network password in Wireshark: http://wiki.wireshark.org/HowToDecrypt802.11 .
Re:This is why sites choose to stay vulnerable to Firesheep by pmjordan on Monday November 08, 2010 @02:08AM (#1881711)
If the shared key is known, it's also trivial to install a rogue access point with the same SSID and a transparent, tampering proxy without a realistic chance of anyone noticing.
Re:This is why sites choose to stay vulnerable to Firesheep by eru on Monday November 08, 2010 @11:29AM (#1882925)
Thanks.
Re:This is why sites choose to stay vulnerable to Firesheep by pilif on Monday November 08, 2010 @04:40AM (#1881941)
if the AP and the gateway are separate devices, couldn't I just ARP-spoof the gateway and get all traffic on the wireless network sent over to me, regardless of encryption?
Re:This is why sites choose to stay vulnerable to Firesheep by nikcub on Sunday November 07, 2010 @09:25PM (#1881129)
ye I should clarify and add that it means you can see the traffic. even if it is switched
Re:This is why sites choose to stay vulnerable to Firesheep by michaelhart on Sunday November 07, 2010 @06:25PM (#1880688)
> The difference between free and $10/year is bigger than most of us think it is.

> I agree with you that we need some good free CAs

https://www.startssl.com/ Supported by just about every browser. Entirely free. A fellow Hacker News user linked to it in a similar thread. I was impressed :)

Re:This is why sites choose to stay vulnerable to Firesheep by kijinbear on Sunday November 07, 2010 @06:43PM (#1880747)
Last time I checked, StartSSL was not recognized by some (slightly old) browsers. I wonder if this issue has been resolved now?
Re:This is why sites choose to stay vulnerable to Firesheep by michaelhart on Sunday November 07, 2010 @06:51PM (#1880768)
Their root CA was generated in 2006. In theory, any browser shipped before 2006 will not support it unless it was added (through, for example, Windows Updates).IE7+ is supported; I haven't tested (and don't care to test) IE6.
Re:This is why sites choose to stay vulnerable to Firesheep by c00ki3s on Monday November 08, 2010 @12:47PM (#1883225)
About 3 years back I used them and back then ie6 didnt' work out of the box. And the windows root cert update didn't help either back then.