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Re:The year in post-quantum crypto [video] by A2017U1 on Sunday December 30, 2018 @07:41AM (#18788897)
While likely right, that particular entry was more a comedy submission by djb himself, no one is taking pqRSA seriously, the merging of the sig/encryption versions too was itself hilarious and a subtle metajoke about how big the competition is. There's plenty on the line here and govts know it, there's a little bit of a lottery feeling associated with it all.

I do like their honesty about people going after easy targets. The real goal here is breaking some of the big contenders and hopefully more people have a crack.

SIKE and NTRU needs some serious attention/money/cred associated with breaking it

Re:The year in post-quantum crypto [video] by jepler on Sunday December 30, 2018 @12:47PM (#18790322)
The danger is that people, like me, will have literally no idea that this is a "comedy submission". I mean, I know that djb is well-respected in his field and so as an interested layperson I would tend to assume that anything that looks serious is serious. In fact, I did just that when I tried to read the pqRSA paper...
Re:The year in post-quantum crypto [video] by tanderson92 on Sunday December 30, 2018 @03:32PM (#18791149)
I don't know how much danger there ever was of taking an e-mail like this one seriously: https://groups.google.com/a/list.nist.gov/forum/#!topic/pqc-...

At the time, it read like pure satire to me.

Re:The year in post-quantum crypto [video] by tptacek on Sunday December 30, 2018 @01:33PM (#18790563)
Why is that a danger?
Re:The year in post-quantum crypto [video] by cyphar on Sunday December 30, 2018 @03:55PM (#18791270)
They might decide to use it, or push for its use in some product. Obviously it's an extreme example, but stuff like that does happen (not that I think cryptographers shouldn't have fun).
Re:The year in post-quantum crypto [video] by tptacek on Sunday December 30, 2018 @04:48PM (#18791542)
You don't think that anyone who would non-ironically implement this paper would do just as much damage with every reasonable cryptography paper?