Filezilla, Notepad++ and 7-zip aren't in themselves mission-critical, but they're hugely popular products. If you can pwn an office computer or a developer workstation, you've made a crucial step towards pwning something properly sensitive. Think about the IT guy in a typical medium-sized business or a government department - what are the first things he's going to install on his own work computer? After Microsoft Office and his browser, what programs will he most often use to open untrusted files from the internet? What happens to the department if a trojan on his machine starts feeding his passwords to the FSB or the PLA?
The decision making process was a survey [0]. The two criteria used were (1) usage of software inside and outside the EU and (2) critical nature of the software for institutions and users.
[0] https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/news/results-eu-fossa-survey
A nation-state adversary with a VLC RCE 0day could do some serious damage; if they also have an 0day for a popular model of CCTV DVR, they've got the keys to the kingdom. Those DVRs will never get patched and a nation-state adversary could dream up all sorts of ways to induce a police officer or an intelligence agent to play a media file, but at least we can harden VLC.
I'd never considered that an excellent media playback program would be a vector for nation state and entities with nation state capabilities.
even glibc?
> I can't see how VLC can be as mission critical as Kafka.
VLC can run on public screens
[0] https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/a-vulnerability-in-7-zip...
My guess is that the main objective is to address user-visible bugs. While a glibc bug is certainly impactful, it is usually solvable before it gets too widespread.
(And as I much as it's "not the right way", higher level apps work around it before it is fixed)
The EU (Brussels offices, etc) actually using them?
We have a mountain of C code running in the wild parsing binary formats that's in real need of some fuzzing or ideally replacement by safer languages.
What's more, getting into one's backend servers/gaining some kind of access to DB, config files of the machine, etc. is, in my mind, just infinitely worse than gaining access to a computer of a person/uploading some ransomware/something similar.
We're just probably working with different SW, so we both see the thing that touches us the most as the problem... :))
If this is the case you have much bigger problems that a bug bounty won't fix.
> in my mind, just infinitely worse than gaining access to a computer of a person/uploading some ransomware/something similar
That depends heavily on what the backend server is. There are plenty of databases where a hack is irrelevant because the data is public and there are backups. Meanwhile most people have poor backups and a hack can be incredibly damaging.
>we both see the thing that touches us the most as the problem
I think you're heavily discounting the risk that all these code bases in general usage pose. I've fuzzed C++ binary parsing code on just a laptop and was amazed at how many crashing bugs I was able to find in a short amount of time. Many of those were probably easily exploitable.
In an ideal world that's what would happen but even if there where the will and the money it would take decades to replace all of this stuff in practice.
Sometimes when I'm feeling pessimistic I don't think we can ever truly secure (to a reasonable standard) anything.
In a previous discussion here someone pointed out you could actually compile C with hardening for out of bounds accesses for example. So maybe we need to isolate those input paths in programs and harden them.
>Sometimes when I'm feeling pessimistic I don't think we can ever truly secure (to a reasonable standard) anything.
I don't think we can either. In part it's just economics, the cost/value of the exploits is just too high for low-value targets. But it's yet another of the reasons I don't see how cryptocurrency ecosystems can really work. The security of the end-points is just way too low for me to trust that kind of thing.
For those who wish to get credit for them, those bug country sites help too.
I also dislike the 'bug bounty platforms'. Why can't I simply report it upstream, and if accepted, claim my price? Each of the projects should have CVE protocols and procedures. The idea probably is to curb the zero-day vulnerability leaks, but I assume that if you're able to find a CVE, you're capable of finding a CVE procedure.
Overall, though, this is great of course.