This is a fundamental misunderstanding of how the IETF works. The IETF codifies industry standards but, as with the W3C, it doesn't have some sort of veto authority over what companies actually implement. If major vendors are using MTA-STS, it's in everyone else's interest that it be described in a public standard. The IETF does get high-quality feedback and I see no reason to question the sincerity of Fastmail's stated reasoning and expressed appreciation.
Similarly, “the authors believe mortal men are not capable of understanding DNSSEC” might be an amusing rhetorical flourish but it's not as convincing as the actual numbers showing that DNSSEC is not reliable on the internet now whereas HTTPS has near-universal deployment _and_ doesn't have the various design flaws which the DNSSEC community is slowly fixing. If you want to protect users, it's usually better to pick something which doesn't require hundreds of parties around the world to make significant changes — and that certainly fits with the “rough consensus and running code” ethos.
HTTPS does seem like overkill, but on the other hand, it's likely already running (even I, who host my own mail, have an HTTP daemon on the same server), so in the common case, it doesn't increase the attack surface.
All because the authors believe mortal men are not capable of understanding DNSSEC. Leaving aside the unholy alliance of Google + Microsoft + Verizon + Comcast, the fact that the IETF made Fastmail ditch authentication from a mail protocol while letting Google subsume DNS and web-based port knocking into another mail protocol definitely tells me there's nobody behind the wheel any more.
I'm happy that the Fastmail team is doing work that excites them, but does anyone know if the IETF has any plans to use ports other than 443 ever again?