But most often what's needed is smarter machines, not less of them.
Inadequate engine performance during take off is a periodic cause of problems. Research was done into whether airports could add markers so that pilots could tell if their acceleration was less than expected. That went nowhere because humans don't have an accurate sense of acceleration or time passing. Today new Airbus jets integrate their position over time and will warn audibly "Check acceleration" if underperforming, long before V1 (maximum abort speed). Meanwhile a common underlying cause of inadequate performance is entering incorrect air temperature, modern Boeings will delete input temperatures that don't resemble the measured temperature at an air intake when the engines switch on. Pilots must enter a plausible temperature and try again, or perform a fully manual take off. So investigators now might recommend one or both of these countermeasures be adopted, or that the research be done again knowing these options exist.
https://www.ntsb.gov/news/speeches/CHart/Documents/hart-2018...
Small nit: V1 is the takeoff decision speed, not the maximum abort speed. If the decision is made to abort right at V1, the airplane will continue to accelerate for a second or so while the crew implements the first action to effect the abort/RTO.
New features can indeed raise unanticipated problems. But that automation isn't added for the lulz, it is added to address other safety problems. The safety record has gotten dramatically better over the decades, and that speaks for itself.
> Would the NTSB ever issue a recommendation like "Your aircraft is too complex" or "You rely on too many computers"? It seems to me like that could be a valid cause, but it's simply not in their vocabulary.
Neither of those vague hand-wavy recommendations are actionable, so the NTSB would never issue them.