Or perhaps our engineering skills, time and resources would be better used saving several order of magnitude more people from death from domestic accidents or drowning.

This sounds like a process, not an engineering problem. The plane had known faulty sensors, and the pilots didn't know about crucial operating features of the plane.

No amount of engineering will save you from this, if you add more they'll maintain it less so that'll fail instead.

The pilots, as part of the 737 type rating requirements, were surely exposed to the QRH checklist for runaway stabilizer, the first page of which is here: http://static-s3.sokoloff.com/flying/other/other/737-QRH-Run...

The Emergency Airworthiness Directive issued after Lion Air 610 crash was, in summary, "Pilots, remember that there is a runaway stabilizer QRH response and pilots should follow that when indicated."

If you're arguing that the pilots didn't know about the possibility of runaway trim, I don't find that very likely. If you're arguing that they didn't specifically know that MCAS could cause runaway trim, I probably agree but think it's irrelevant as the response to runaway trim is not to diagnose or draw the system diagram of the fault, but rather to simply stop the fault, which the stock 737 checklist would have accomplished, if followed.

How much resources would you put towards improving airplanes to save those 400 people?

You would almost certainly see better returns if those same resources were put towards improving cars, or roads, or curing disease, or infant mortality, or healthcare, or education.

In our current and economic system the money that air travel generates is not going to be made available for any of those other fine causes, it's going to either be used to make air travel safer and more environmentally friendly, or it's going to be used to pay dividends to shareholders. It will only be used for safety and environmental standards (and crew care, and passenger comfort) if travellers demand it is and refuse to fly on lines that don't conform.

Boeing makes safer airplanes than the FAA requires.

For example, twin engines are statistically safer than more engines, and Boeing had to lobby the FAA to allow them over water.

For another, Boeing wings do not have hydraulics that extend past the engines. Torque tubes are used to transmit power further. This is so that a major engine failure won't damage the hydraulic system. This was not a requirement until a crash from another manufacturer's airplane was due to such damage, and Boeing airplanes were not susceptible to that failure mode.

Your theories about how the industry works are speculation.

All theories are speculation, but these are based on observation and contact with the industry. Boeing have acted in exactly the way that my theories predict and dictate; they are certainly reactive to the threat of regulation and customer pressure. If Boeing was to become an "unsafe" brand their shareholders would be very damaged.

The twin engine statistics story that you cite is not the story that I remember for the 777.The FAA had rules which were based on the behaviour of old engines and dictated that an twin engine aircraft should be a smaller distance from an emergency strip than was possible for the best routes across the major oceans (I believe it ruled out the Pacific routes completely). Boeing demonstrated (successfully and correctly) that modern engines failed so rarely that the four vs two distinction was obsolete.

What has happened in recent years is that another failure mode has emerged, it's a complex one due to pilot training, HCI and the vulnerability of automated systems to failure in modes where common sense knowledge could protect them. I expect and believe that the systems and institutions of the aerospace industry will be fully strong enough to manage this, but I don't think that this is the case for many other industries that are beginning to experience the same sort of problems - notably self driving cars and computer medicine.. Many people think differently - the test of theories is time, so we shall see.

That actually is a good point. Thank you for the perspective.

> we have a moral responsibility to solve this problem.

Not everyone (including myself) has the same morals as you.

I'm not claiming there is no trade-off saving 400 more people (as basically all everyone replied to me) but engineers have an implicit agreement with the society and ethical practice is a big part of engineering, at least this is what I was taught. The reason this trade-off is irrelevant is because if you're not employed by an aeroapace company, you do not have any implicit responsiblity regarding those 400 people. So what is being claimed here is not that we all should stop and save those 400 people. E.g. I work for a telematics company I'm absolutely responsible of every person injured in a car crash that my engineering solutions could save them. But the same cannot be said about casualties in airplane crashes.

I used to work for Boeing on the 757 stabilizer trim system. I can verify that the engineers who work on such flight critical systems are very much aware of their responsibilities to make them as safe as they can. None of them want anything to do with creating an unsafe design.