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Re:UC Berkeley to build open-source secure enclave using RISC-V by anonymousDan on Friday December 14, 2018 @05:40AM (#18679858)
HSMs have been around for donkey's years. SGX is interesting because now you can run e.g. a whole database inside an enclave on commodity CPUs with competitive performance.
Re:UC Berkeley to build open-source secure enclave using RISC-V by mtgx on Friday December 14, 2018 @06:56AM (#18680216)
Arm has already announced crypto-processors, which I assume aren't very expensive. Every chip maker could use one as an HSM now.

https://developer.arm.com/products/system-ip/security-ip/cry...

https://developer.arm.com/products/system-ip/security-ip/cry...

Re:UC Berkeley to build open-source secure enclave using RISC-V by MaxBarraclough on Friday December 14, 2018 @07:46AM (#18680414)
So the chip-maker would have their hardware protect the permanent secret key, and use ARM's coprocessor to do the cryptographic heavy-lifting? Sounds reasonable.

Is that the first high-level crypto coprocessor then? I'm surprised it's taken this long.

Re:UC Berkeley to build open-source secure enclave using RISC-V by jchw on Friday December 14, 2018 @10:45AM (#18681594)
I always thought the purported advantage of SGX was being able to run important bits of code with ensured integrity, using attestation, even on an unsecure machine. If you ran a whole database in SGX or TrustZone, you just open yourself up to traditional security vulnerabilities alongside the usual side channel attacks you can do against them.
Re:UC Berkeley to build open-source secure enclave using RISC-V by anonymousDan on Friday December 14, 2018 @10:53AM (#18681659)
Well yes, but I AFAIK remote attestation for specialized security processors has been around for a while. You are of course right that you still have a large attack surface + side channels etc. But at least you can't just snoop on the RAM.