Re:UC Berkeley to build open-source secure enclave using RISC-V
by gmueckl on Thursday December 13, 2018 @11:57PM
(#18678571)
No, this is actually not retarded if you need to store program code externally and want to make sure that this code is unaltered. The XBox 360 early boot did this as an anti-piracy measure IIRC: a minimal on-chip program would load and verify the first couple of blocks of externally stored firmware before executing them.
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Re:UC Berkeley to build open-source secure enclave using RISC-V
by excalibur on Friday December 14, 2018 @12:09AM
(#18678611)
Yes, if you the manufacturer want to make sure that nobody but you can alter the data. If you're providing cryptographic hardware for somebody else, they're gonna want to set their own.
Re:UC Berkeley to build open-source secure enclave using RISC-V
by lclarkmichalek on Friday December 14, 2018 @07:04AM
(#18680241)
In my experience, that's not usually a requirement. From an implementation perspective, you just say 'this certificate is the root' and trust it explicitly without needing access to the key on the HSM. From a security perspective, adding the ability to set your own key is a risk (adds RW storage to a previously immutable system, changes the model from 'no one ever sees the key' to 'no one ever sees the key as long as it was written correctly and any non hsm stored copy is deleted'), and doesn't really improve the security of the system - you trust the HSM manufacturer already, seeing as it's their hardware.
Re:UC Berkeley to build open-source secure enclave using RISC-V
by excalibur on Friday December 14, 2018 @07:59AM
(#18680485)
Clearly we run in different circles. In my experience keys need to be generated regularly and rotated on a predetermined schedule. Immutable systems are kind of the antithesis of that.
Re:UC Berkeley to build open-source secure enclave using RISC-V
by lclarkmichalek on Friday December 14, 2018 @11:10AM
(#18681811)
You might/should rotate the leaf keys regularly, but root keys are a massive pain to rotate (when you change a root key, you need to reprovision the corresponding cert onto every machine, as they're the root of trust for your PKI). You can buy a new HSM every 3 years to rotate those root keys, which fits fairly well into most organisation's decommissioning cycles.
Re:UC Berkeley to build open-source secure enclave using RISC-V
by excalibur on Friday December 14, 2018 @12:59PM
(#18682888)
Root keys are more of a pain to swap out, but AD does a pretty good job of handling the grunt work of distributing them across the organization. And the leaf keys should live on HSMs as well. You might be able to get by with a hardcoded root key if you're willing to accept the tradeoff, but that situation isn't going to work for the rest.
Re:UC Berkeley to build open-source secure enclave using RISC-V
by lclarkmichalek on Friday December 14, 2018 @05:00PM
(#18685236)
AD and similar things def help, but it's still hard, especially once your deployment gets big or complicated - at the last place I worked we had tons of linux hosts + google cloud load balancers + aws load balancers + a tiny AD domain + various others. I think once you hit a certain size, it's incredibly hard to keep homogeneity.
Leaf keys on HSMs is interesting. Personally, I view HSM and TPM stored keys about having an immutable identity for the device. Leaf keys are usually a bit more complicated - in the environments I work in, leaf keys are often tied to a service, not the host. The short lived nature also reduces the impact of ex-filtration.
Anyway, yeah, depends on the deployment and the org.
Re:UC Berkeley to build open-source secure enclave using RISC-V
by gmueckl on Friday December 14, 2018 @02:27AM
(#18679124)
If you do this, you weaken your device against hostile tempering as well, don't you? The key update mechanism becomes part of the attack surface.