Re:Thieves boosting signal from key fobs inside homes to ste...
by DBNO on Wednesday December 05, 2018 @10:49PM
(#18615228)
This is basically the solution. Light travels about 1 foot in one nanosecond, so the car needs to reject latent replies.
I did research in this area a few years ago. Here's a research paper [1] from 1993 that goes into more detail about this type of "distance bounding" solution (i.e. authenticating received signal only if 1) it is received within a few nanoseconds AND 2) the decrypted received signal contains the previously sent random number) in order to defend against "relay attacks". The paper discloses many variations to this general solution as well.
[1] Brands and Chaum, "Distance-Bounding Protocols"
Re:Thieves boosting signal from key fobs inside homes to ste...
by starbeast on Thursday December 06, 2018 @05:34AM
(#18616850)
I realised after writing it that you don't actually need to send the time itself, but it was my first 5 minute stab. Plus it is sort of fun to have the time flying about.
edit - thanks for the link, having a read through.
The clock has to be pretty fast, but you can get a secure time of flight measurement, so you can absolutely know the distance of the radio signal path.